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JIM ROSSI* 
This Article provides a comprehensive analysis of state constitutional 
limits on legislative incorporation of dynamic federal law, as occurs 
when a state legislature incorporates future federal tax, 
environmental, or health regulations. Many state judicial decisions 
draw on the nondelegation doctrine to endorse an ex ante prohibition 
on state legislative incorporation of dynamic federal law. However, 
the analysis in this Article shows how bedrock principles related to 
separation of powers under state constitutions, such as protecting 
transparency, reinforcing accountability, and protecting against 
arbitrariness in lawmaking, are not consistent with this approach. 
Instead, this Article evaluates two practices that can make dynamic 
incorporation of federal law more compatible with state separation of 
powers: (a) accountable intermediaries, such as administrative 
agencies, as a way of preserving political accountability with 
incorporation of dynamic federal sources of law; and (b) ex post 
judicial review, as a mechanism to provide standards and safeguards 
to protect against arbitrariness in lawmaking. The analysis highlights 
serious flaws with judicial interpretations of state constitutions that 
impose an ex ante barrier to the adoption of dynamic federal law. It 
also advances “hard look federalism” as a novel approach to judicial 
review by state appellate courts that can allow states to both protect 
their own separation of powers concerns and improve the operation of 
federalism, particular by enhancing state participation in adoption, 
interpretation, and implementation of federal standards. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In drafting statutes state legislatures frequently adopt by reference the laws 
of other sovereigns. The practice of incorporation by reference has frequently 
been questioned under state constitutions, especially in instances where the 
incorporated law is dynamic or subject to future changes by another legal 
body.1 This Article examines state constitutional limits on legislative 
incorporation of dynamic federal law, as occurs when a state legislature 
incorporates future federal tax, environmental, or health laws.  
While many state judicial decisions express constitutional concern about 
state legislatures incorporating dynamic federal law, I show how these 
concerns are not consistent with bedrock principles related to separation of 
powers under state constitutions. Rather, I argue that (a) accountable 
intermediaries, such as administrative agencies, can help to ensure political 
accountability with incorporation of dynamic federal sources of law and (b) ex 
post judicial review also provides standards and safeguards that can protect 
                                                                                                                     
 1 See Horace Emerson Read, Is Referential Legislation Worth While?, 25 MINN. L. 
REV. 261, 270–76 (1941). See generally Kendall v. United States, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524 
(1838); Griswold v. Atl. Dock Co., 21 Barb. 225 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1855); State v. 
Charlesworth, 951 P.2d 153 (Or. Ct. App. 1997).  
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core separation of powers values. My analysis shows the flaws with judicial 
interpretations of state constitutions that impose an ex ante barrier to the 
adoption of dynamic federal law. It also advances a novel approach to judicial 
review by state appellate courts as a way for states to both protect their own 
separation of powers concerns and to improve state participation in the 
adoption and implementation of federal standards.  
In Part II, I describe a number of established state laws that incorporate or 
authorize adoption of dynamic federal law, and discuss their benefits.2 
Incorporation by reference is a longstanding and commonplace practice in the 
drafting of legislation3 and agency regulations.4 The source of reference may 
be private bodies.5 State legislatures sometimes also borrow parallel sources of 
law, such as the law of another state, as may occur in the uniform lawmaking 
process.6 But states also frequently incorporate by reference existing federal 
standards—a source of law that is (at least theoretically) more hierarchical in 
                                                                                                                     
 2 This Article focuses on the state incorporation of federal legislative standards under 
state constitutions, not on state incorporation of federal constitutional doctrine. Some state 
courts or constitutions also may follow the U.S. Supreme Court on particular constitutional 
issues, ensuring that similar state and federal constitutional provisions are interpreted in 
lockstep. See, e.g., Christopher Slobogin, State Adoption of Federal Law: Exploring the 
Limits of Florida’s “Forced Linkage” Amendment, 39 U. FLA. L. REV. 653, 654–55 (1987) 
(discussing a 1983 amendment to Florida’s constitution that mandates that the state’s 
prohibitions on unconstitutional searches and seizures conform with the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of the Fourth Amendment); Robert F. Williams, State Courts 
Adopting Federal Constitutional Doctrine: Case-by-Case Adoptionism or Prospective 
Lockstepping?, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1499, 1502–20 (2005) (describing the judicial 
approach of lockstep interpretation between state constitutions and the U.S. Constitution).  
 3 See generally John Mark Keyes, Incorporation by Reference in Legislation, 25 
STATUTE L. REV. 180 (2004) (describing the drafting technique, incorporation by reference, 
and setting forth the advantages and disadvantages in the manner in which it is used).  
 4 At the federal level, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1) (2012) specifically authorizes 
incorporation by reference of materials that the Director of the Office of the Federal 
Register (OFR) finds to be “reasonably available to the class of persons affected thereby.” 
See, e.g., Emily S. Bremer, Incorporation by Reference in an Open-Government Age, 36 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 131, 133 (2013); Peter L. Strauss, Private Standards 
Organizations and Public Law, 22 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 497, 498 (2013) (discussing 
incorporation of private standards into administrative regulations); see also Incorporation 
by Reference, ADMIN. CONF. U.S., https://www.acus.gov/research-projects/ 
incorporation-reference [https://perma.cc/H7QS-QH4R] (proposing “ways to ensure that 
materials subject to incorporation by reference are reasonably available to the regulated 
community and other interested parties, to update regulations that incorporate by reference, 
and to navigate procedural requirements and drafting difficulties when incorporating by 
reference”). 
 5 See, e.g., Nina A. Mendelson, Private Control over Access to the Law: The 
Perplexing Federal Use of Private Standards, 112 MICH. L. REV. 737, 737 (2014).  
 6 See, e.g., Larry E. Ribstein & Bruce H. Kobayashi, An Economic Analysis of 
Uniform State Laws, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 131, 132 (1996).  
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nature, under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution.7 Even when they 
are not compelled by the Supremacy Clause, state lawmakers frequently 
incorporate by reference federal standards, in effect, “delegating up”8 the 
content of future standard setting to the federal government. This form of 
“dynamic incorporation” of federal law is commonplace in state legislation as 
well as in state administrative agency rulemaking.9 It produces many benefits 
for state lawmaking, including promoting uniformity, efficiency, flexibility, 
and reinforcing coordination between state and federal regulation. 
Part III describes how separation of powers under state constitutions often 
presents an ex ante barrier to state incorporation of dynamic federal law.10 In 
most states, the nondelegation doctrine remains alive and well as a more 
substantial restrictive of the legislature’s power to delegate to agencies than 
the U.S. Constitution’s limits on Congress’s delegations to federal agencies. 
There are, of course, many differences among the states, but states can be 
roughly grouped into those that emphasize a need for procedural safeguards 
and those that emphasize some need for substantive constraints on legislative 
delegations.11 Several state courts have rejected almost any “delegation” that 
relies on future federal administrative agency determinations.12 The effect of 
these decisions serves to freeze state incorporation of federal standards in 
place at the time of the initial legislative delegation, requiring new legislative 
action at the state level to update state statutes as federal law or regulations 
change. I frame this kind of constitutional approach as a “resistance norm” 
                                                                                                                     
 7 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United 
States . . . , shall be the supreme Law of the Land.”).  
 8 See Ruth Mason, Delegating Up: State Conformity with the Federal Tax Base, 62 
DUKE L.J. 1267, 1267–68 (2013) (describing federal-state tax base conformity as a type of 
upward delegation problem). 
 9 I borrow the term “dynamic incorporation” from Michael Dorf’s terrific assessment 
of the broader phenomenon associated with a legislature adopting dynamic law from an 
external sovereign. See Michael C. Dorf, Dynamic Incorporation of Foreign Law, 157 U. 
PA. L. REV. 103, 103–04 (2008) (focusing on the democratic challenge presented by 
national incorporation of supranational sources of law).  
 10 The notion of separation of powers that I discuss in this Article is consistent with 
the American tradition of checks and balances in the design of constitutions. This tradition 
of shared powers, in contrast to complete separation of the branches of government, has a 
long legacy under state constitutions. As Gordon Wood has observed, even the earliest 
state constitutions did not separate the power of each of the branches, but allowed 
legislatures to appoint governors, executive officers, and judges. See GORDON S. WOOD, 
THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776–1787, at 155–56 (1969).  
 11 For broader discussion of the nondelegation doctrine in state courts making a 
similar grouping of approaches, see Jim Rossi, Institutional Design and the Lingering 
Legacy of Antifederalist Separation of Powers Ideals in the States, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1167, 
1191–1201 (1999).  
 12 For discussion, see my typology of criminal, regulatory, and cooperative federalism 
cases rejecting dynamic federal law on separation of powers grounds, infra Part III.  
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against state legislatures importing dynamic sources of federal law,13 and 
discuss what might motivate state courts to adopt this kind of ex ante barrier to 
legislative adoption of dynamic sources of federal law.  
Part IV gauges ex ante constitutional barriers to state incorporation of 
dynamic sources of federal law against some bedrock principles that state 
constitutions reinforce for the exercise of legislative power: enhancing 
transparency, ensuring political accountability, and protecting against arbitrary 
lawmaking. I show that any concerns with transparency and accountability in 
use of dynamic federal law appear overstated and are better addressed by other 
constitutional protections or by institutional design—in particular the 
establishment of an accountable intermediary with direct accountability to the 
legislature, such as a state agency, to approve future changes to federal law. 
Arbitrariness is a potential concern any time there is a risk of future legal 
change, but I argue that the nondelegation doctrine is not necessary to protect 
this value because of the availability of ex post judicial review.  
The role of ex post judicial review as a constitutional safeguard to 
delegations is hardly a new insight, but the implications for state judicial 
review in this context are novel. In adopting dynamic federal law, a state 
legislature is also implicitly adopting any limits on future legal change under 
federal law, including statutes and administrative law. In other words, future 
decisions regarding the legal effects of federal law are constrained by an 
identifiable and fixed source of law (albeit external to the state) that state 
courts can apply in ex post judicial review, under the arbitrary and capricious 
standard. Even where this standard of review may be not available in a 
particular state, legislative adoption of dynamic federal law that depends on 
future federal agency decisions may implicitly authorize state courts to adopt 
federal arbitrary and capricious review standards—what I call “hard look 
federalism.”14 Such an approach presents a significant opportunity for states to 
enhance their federalism role in the adoption, interpretation, and 
implementation of federal law. 
Part V concludes using state constitutions to erect ex ante barriers to the 
use of dynamic federal law does violence to both federalism principles and 
state constitutions. Both federalism and state constitutions should favor use of 
the political process over constitutional prohibitions on the exercise of a 
political branch’s authority to enact laws, such as the nondelegation doctrine 
as an ex ante constraint on incorporation of dynamic federal law. With 
appropriate attention to institutional design and the availability of ex post 
judicial review—especially bootstrapping state arbitrary and capricious review 
                                                                                                                     
 13 While this Article focuses on incorporation of dynamic federal law, the same 
analysis can extend to other dynamic external sources of law, including delegations to 
other states or to private standard setting bodies. Some of the analytical questions posed 
below, in Part IV, would also seem to have traction in addressing these types of 
delegations. See infra Part IV. 
 14 See infra Part IV.C. 
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on federal law—the state political process can provide a more effective check 
and balance on incorporation of dynamic sources of federal law. 
II. HOW DYNAMIC INCORPORATIONS OF FEDERAL LAW ARE 
COMMONPLACE AND UNDERTHEORIZED 
The relationship between state and federal law is often complex. As a 
common illustration of how federal and state systems are not acoustically 
separate in nature, in many situations where Congress has authorized states, 
often through a state attorney general, to enforce federal statutes or regulatory 
standards, as where Congress has authorized state attorney generals to sue in 
federal court for enforcement of the Federal Trade Act or Americans with 
Disabilities Act.15 It is important, however, “to separate the question of state 
enforcement from that of state regulatory authority.”16 This Article focuses on 
regulation, or the substantive content of law, not its enforcement. Of course, in 
many, if not most, areas where states regulate activities, Congress has broad 
authority to preempt states under the Commerce Clause.17 Even where 
Congress or a federal regulatory agency has not preempted states by binding 
them to substantive federal law, states continue to possess their own authority 
to regulate, even in areas where some existing federal regulation also exists.18  
This Article focuses on the extent to which a state’s constitution allows a 
legislative body to base the content of its laws on the law of the federal 
government. This Part describes how state legislatures frequently rely on 
incorporation of dynamic federal law in their lawmaking task, discusses its 
benefits, and highlights how the constitutional problem that this presents under 
state separation of powers is undertheorized.  
A. Common Examples of State Incorporations of Dynamic Federal Law 
As Sir Courtenay Ilbert has observed, “[n]o statute is completely 
intelligible as an isolated enactment.”19 Every statute “involves references, 
                                                                                                                     
 15 See Margaret H. Lemos, State Enforcement of Federal Law, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
698, 702 (2011) (noting how with state enforcement of federal law state enforcers can be 
empowered to act “even in areas where state law is preempted or where state regulators 
have chosen not to act”).  
 16 Id. at 715. As Lemos notes: “Typically, the two go hand in hand: A government 
creates laws and then enforces them. But state enforcement of federal law breaks that link 
by authorizing state actors to enforce the law of a different sovereign.” Id. 
 17 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o regulate 
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian 
Tribes.”).  
 18 As Scott Dodson explains, in these areas “state actors have authority to craft 
regimes and render interpretations different from—even contrary to—federal law.” But 
still, in significant measure, “they instead follow federal law.” Scott Dodson, The 
Gravitational Force of Federal Law, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 703, 706 (2016). 
 19 COURTENAY ILBERT, LEGISLATIVE METHODS AND FORMS 254 (1901). 
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express or implied, to the rules of the common law, and to the provisions of 
other statutes bearing on the same subject.”20 In drafting legislation, it is 
common for state legislatures to incorporate by reference a range of different 
laws.21  
This Article focuses on state legislative reference to federal sources of law, 
in the form of incorporation by reference or delegation. Such legislation 
references future federal law or regulation as the basis for substantive law. To 
illustrate the constitutional question presented by state incorporation of 
dynamic sources of federal law, consider some of the following common 
examples: 
 Many states have adopted provisions of federal law classifying drugs 
as “controlled substances” based on federal law, drawing on the 
scientific expertise of federal regulators and promoting uniformity 
through convergence in the definition of federal and state crimes.22  
 State revenue agencies are commonly instructed by a state legislature 
to adopt/rely upon Internal Revenue Service definitions or 
interpretations related to the definition of “income” as well as the 
definition of various tax credits or deductions.23 
 Many state consumer protection agencies operate under “mini-FTC 
Acts” that incorporate Federal Trade Commission definitions of 
“unfair,” “deceptive,” or “misleading” trade practices.24 
 State health and environmental agencies implementing cooperative 
federal programs are sometimes told to meet federal standards in order 
to qualify for federal funding, or are instructed by state legislatures to 
apply federal quantitative thresholds, standards, and definitions 
involving technical terms.25 
 The vast majority of state banking regulators draw on Federal Reserve 
Board regulations in deciding when state bank regulation is 
triggered.26  
These examples share (a) a state legislative delegation, and (b) some 
constraint on the scope of this delegation based on existing or future federal 
law. In other words, these are not mere delegations, as often occur in state 
legislating, but are delegations of a special sort. They delegate authority to 
                                                                                                                     
 20 Id.  
 21 See, e.g., Arie Poldervaart, Legislation by Reference—A Statutory Jungle, 38 IOWA 
L. REV. 705, 705 (1953); Read, supra note 1, at 263. 
 22 See infra Part III.A. 
 23 See Mason, supra note 8, at 1275–76; see also infra Part IV.  
 24 Henry N. Butler & Joshua D. Wright, Are State Consumer Protection Acts Really 
Little-FTC Acts?, 63 FLA. L. REV. 163, 164–65 (2011) (observing how many states 
incorporate FTC standards, but also go even further in prohibiting conduct).  
 25 See infra Part III.A.3. 
 26 John J. Schroeder, Note, “Duel” Banking System? State Bank Parity Laws: An 
Examination of Regulatory Practice, Constitutional Issues, and Philosophical Questions, 
36 IND. L. REV. 197, 200–01 (2003). 
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regulate based on the actions of a sovereign other than the state that is 
legislating. Moreover, the sovereign actions that determine the content of 
regulation, and presumably might constrain, future law are national in nature. 
These kinds of delegations thus raise distinct issues related to constitutional 
federalism: They are state in terms of the political choice surrounding their 
initial enactments, but they also draw on federal sources of law for their 
content and constraints.  
B. Benefits of Dynamic Incorporations of Federal Law 
State legislative delegations that incorporate the laws of the federal 
government produce benefits for both state and federal lawmaking in specific 
areas of regulation.27 They can help to promote greater uniformity, as may be 
particularly valued in areas such as tax or banking regulation.28 Uniformity 
may occur at the level of parallel (or horizontal) jurisdictions, to the extent that 
multiple state legislatures settle the same approach, through explicit or implicit 
coordination. Such an approach is common to the uniform lawmaking 
process,29 as well as to state legislature consideration of model statutes.30 But 
beyond this, a state legislature incorporating the laws of the federal 
government can produce vertical coordination benefits between the federal and 
state levels of government and, where widespread (as this appears to be in the 
contexts of tax and banking regulation), this can also facilitate greater 
horizontal coordination. This kind of coordination is valuable to any 
regulatory area that favors national consistency and seeks to avoid 
inconsistencies and conflicts between jurisdictions.  
In addition, horizontal coordination (between states) helps to reduce 
compliance costs for firms that operate on a national level, as may be 
especially important for nationwide companies that are subject to tax or 
business regulation across multiple jurisdictions. These coordination benefits 
are hardly limited to tax and business regulation, and may extend to other area 
of regulation where private businesses need to comply across multiple 
jurisdictions, including in health, labor and environmental regulatory arenas.31 
Especially in the context of what Abbe Gluck has coined “intrastatutory 
federalism”32—state implementation of regulation within federal statutes, as 
                                                                                                                     
 27 A general discussion of the explanations for the phenomenon is also presented by 
Dodson, supra note 18, at 706.  
 28 See id. at 732–36; see also John W. Brabner-Smith, Incorporation by Reference 
and Delegation of Power—Validity of “Reference” Legislation, 5 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
198, 211 (1936–1937). 
 29 See Ribstein & Kobayashi, supra note 6, at 132. 
 30 Id. 
 31 See infra Part III.A. 
 32 Abbe R. Gluck, Intrastatutory Federalism and Statutory Interpretation: State 
Implementation of Federal Law in Health Reform and Beyond, 121 YALE L.J. 534, 534 
(2011). 
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often occurs with cooperative federalism programs that can potentially 
preempt state law—the benefits of incorporation of dynamic federal law may 
be of greatest significance, but by no means are these benefits limited to the 
cooperative federalism context. It also bears noting that increasingly 
nongovernmental organizations that monitor both state and federal regulation 
operate nationally, so convergence of standards can facilitate better regulatory 
monitoring by third parties, as well as private compliance.33  
Notably, incorporation by reference of sources of federal law can also 
allow states to draw on the expertise of federal agencies in situations where 
that same expertise is not available at the state or local level.34 After all, most 
state agencies have small staffs, and lack the stability, funding or level of 
professionalism necessary to ensure consistent, thorough, and state-of-the-art 
evaluation of scientific and technical issues. The role of such expertise is 
especially important in the context of drug, health, or safety regulation, where 
an evaluation of the scientific connection between risk and harm depends on 
complex data analysis and modeling. Due to resource limitations and small 
agency size, in comparison to federal agencies state regulators are likely to 
have limited expertise and experience in other regulatory arenas too, such as 
banking, securities, and antitrust regulation.35 
There is also a more general efficiency to relying on the incorporation of 
federal law, insofar as this avoids needlessly duplication of decision-making 
processes. Relying on the expertise and judgment of a federal agency keeps 
individual states from having to reproduce the research, political processes, 
and opportunities for input that have already occurred at the federal level of 
government. If the federal government has already sought nationwide input, 
gathered information from a broad range of stakeholders, and evaluated this 
input in adopting standards, it is not clear what is gained by requiring a state to 
engage the same process all over again, on a smaller scale. In fact, it may well 
be the case that a state legislature prefers the national political process as the 
sources of input in addressing difficult regulatory questions; in contrast to a 
state decision-making process, a national process may dilute the influence of 
powerful state or local interest groups and allow the content of regulation to 
draw from a broader range of geographic and substantive influences. 
C. Significance for State Constitutional Law 
Through constitutional bans on amending legislation by reference, some 
state constitutions expressly prohibit a legislature from incorporating federal 
standards without reproducing the complete text of the existing federal law—
in effect limiting any ability to use “dynamic” sources of federal law without 
                                                                                                                     
 33 See infra Part III.B. 
 34 See Gluck, supra note 32, at 602. 
 35 See Brabner-Smith, supra note 28, at 203–04; cf. Gluck, supra note 32, at 566. 
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reenactment by a state legislature each time the law changes.36 Any referential 
legislation can create a form of what F. Scott Boyd has called “looking glass 
law.”37 As metaphor from Lewis Carroll’s sequel to Alice in Wonderland 
suggests, the concern with a widespread practice of allowing state legislatures 
to incorporate by reference sources of law from outside of their jurisdictional 
borders is that this may result in a regime of legal rules where nothing is quite 
like it seems.38 To be sure, legislation by reference could obscure the content 
of law and lead to confusion, if for example citizens are led to confuse one 
jurisdiction’s laws with another’s.  
The use of federal law is least controversial—and seems to be of little 
constitutional concern—when a state legislature incorporates past federal legal 
enactments, especially fixing in past federal law. A predominant account of 
state constitutions views state constitutions as independent sources of positive 
law.39 On such an account, protecting a particular state’s sovereignty in 
lawmaking could be considered essential to avoiding the transfer and 
obfuscation of sovereignty through acts of delegation. Even on this rigid 
positive account, it is not clear, though that enacting state laws that incorporate 
or draw on existing federal law is a problem: the political choice regarding the 
content of law is still made by a state legislature, and as long as it is aware of 
                                                                                                                     
 36 For discussion of some of these prohibitions, see Brabner-Smith, supra note 28, at 
199–202. Although many state constitutions still contain these kinds of bans, as I discuss in 
Part IV, courts do not always interpret them as imposing a rigid ex ante prohibition on the 
legislature’s ability to adopt dynamic federal law. The touchstone analysis typically 
focuses on whether the legislation is considered complete on its own terms—and state 
courts routinely allow common law and other legal sources to inform this analysis.  
 37 See generally F. Scott Boyd, Looking Glass Law: Legislation by Reference in the 
States, 68 LA. L. REV. 1201, 1203 (2008) (discussing how “[a] reference statute may seem 
to the uninitiated to be only a simple reflection of the referenced material, but like the 
world in Alice’s looking glass, on close examination it often proves to be quite a bit more 
complicated”). 
 38 Id. at 1203. See generally LEWIS CARROLL, ALICE’S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND 
AND THROUGH THE LOOKING-GLASS (Penguin Classics 1998) (1865, 1872) (wherein Alice 
ponders what the world is like on the other side of a mirror’s reflection and then discovers 
a fantastic alternative world when she steps through the mirror).  
 39 The view of independent state constitutionalism is often associated with Justice 
William Brennan’s call to arms that state constitutions can serve as an antidote to federal 
courts’ willingness to defer to governmental actions affecting individual rights. William J. 
Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 
489, 491 (1977); see also ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, THE LAW OF AMERICAN STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS 8–11 (2009) (arguing that each state court has an obligation to interpret its 
own constitutional rights provisions on its own terms). Most advocates of independent state 
constitutionalism focus primarily on the independence of state courts from the federal 
judiciary in interpreting constitutional rights. However, in linking this view to positivism, I 
only intend to highlight how this view of state constitutionalism also envisions a state 
constitution as an independent expression of sovereignty. I thus see independent state 
constitutionalism as consistent with, and perhaps even reinforcing, the notion that each 
state constitution contains it own self-contained positivist rule of recognition regarding the 
laws of that particular state. 
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the content of federal law and identifies and communicates that content to the 
public it is not clear why this would be problematic, for even the most rigid 
positivist account of independent state constitutionalism.40  
When a state legislature incorporates dynamic federal law as well as 
existing federal standards, a delegation is more likely to present confusion, to 
both enacting bodies and to the public. As Ernst Freund wrote in 1932, this 
method of allowing continual updating of legislation based on reference in 
order to conform with an external source of law is not a new phenomenon.41 
Nor are the concerns with it, as Freund himself warned: “judicial decisions 
holding that the reference is to the statute in its form at the time of 
incorporation” makes the use of dynamic sources of federal law “not 
absolutely reliable.”42 Unfortunately, not even the most staunch advocates of 
independent state constitutionalism have made an effort to unravel what it is 
that makes this kind of incorporation by reference suspect. At a general level, 
it seems that any concerns can be sorted into transparency problems, 
accountability deficiencies, and the fears associated with arbitrariness in future 
decision-making. I highlight these concerns here and return to them in greater 
depth below.43  
The incorporation of foreign sources of law can present transparency 
problems, to the extent that a constitutional decision maker is not aware of the 
content of a foreign law he or she is asked to vote for. Of course this assumes 
that state legislators are aware of the content of state laws when they vote on 
them—an assumption that one might call into question.44 Another kind of 
transparency problem is that the public may not be aware of the exact content 
of the laws a legislature has actually adopted, and thus may lack the notice 
necessary to comply with legal enactments.45  
In addition to lawmaker and public awareness problems, incorporation by 
reference of dynamic federal law may present accountability deficiencies into 
the state political process. For example, if the content of a source of law is 
unknown, or depends on some future decision, it is not clear who should bear 
                                                                                                                     
 40 See, e.g., WILLIAMS, supra note 39, at 8–11. 
 41 See, e.g., ERNST FREUND, LEGISLATIVE REGULATION: A STUDY OF THE WAYS AND 
MEANS OF WRITTEN LAW § 16, at 46 (1932).  
 42 Id. 
 43 See infra Part IV. 
 44 It has been noted that members of Congress are unlikely to have read legislation on 
which they vote, since the incentives are for them to prioritize politics over substance. See 
generally, e.g., ROBERT G. KAISER, ACT OF CONGRESS: HOW AMERICA’S ESSENTIAL 
INSTITUTION WORKS, AND HOW IT DOESN’T (2013). A similar type of legislator ignorance 
may plague state legislatures, especially to the extent that many state legislators only serve 
part-time in these positions. See, e.g., PEVERILL SQUIRE & GARY MONCRIEF, STATE 
LEGISLATURES TODAY: POLITICS UNDER THE DOMES 73–75 (2d ed. 2015).  
 45 See generally KAISER, supra note 44 (telling the story of the complex and 
consequential piece of legislation, the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act, that regulated Wall Street and created a Consumer Financial Protection 
Agency as an example of the manner in which Congress enacts laws). 
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responsibility for the policy choice behind adopting it. Where the foreign 
source of law is dynamic and may change in the future, concerns with 
accountability thus also seem to be greater—or at least more difficult to 
monitor and correct through the channels of ordinary state politics.  
The incorporation of dynamic federal law may also produce special 
concerns insofar as it enables a state legislature to cede some control over the 
content of law to the federal government. With the loss of control, a state also 
may perceive some loss of the ability to protect its citizens against arbitrary 
lawmaking or arbitrary expansions of federal power. The idea that state 
constitutions have a role in protecting a state’s citizens from the loss of liberty 
represented by the expansion of federal lawmaking power is not a view that is 
limited to those who see state constitutions as independent sources of positive 
law, but includes more sophisticated accounts that embed state constitutions 
within a federal system of government.46  
Although these reasons are rarely stated by courts, as I discuss below in 
Part III, many state courts have imposed an ex ante constitutional constraint on 
a state legislature incorporating federal law—especially dynamic federal 
law—under the nondelegation doctrine.47 While the questions presented by the 
use of dynamic federal law in state legislation are difficult ones, I maintain 
that the basic separation of powers analysis they present is not fantastical or 
intractable.48 To the extent that state legislation makes the incorporation of 
federal law automatic, the delegation to the federal government allows a 
federal government actor to have an immediate legal effect in a state 
jurisdiction, absent additional state legislative action to revoke the federal 
standards.49 But any decision to apply or enforce future federal law is not 
automatic, but is contingent on the decision of an arm of state government. For 
example, often a legislature will instruct a state agency to apply federal 
standards, or may authorize the agency to draw on federal law as it sees fit, 
making the use of future federal law contingent on the future actions of a state 
regulator. It may well be that the use of federal sovereignty in state law adds a 
“looking glass” of sorts that obscures the legislative process, as F. Scott Boyd 
has suggested.50 Yet, just as Alice’s mirror could help her to see things that are 
not visible without its help,51 allowing a legislature to draw on dynamic 
federal sources of law also provides state law makers an efficient and effective 
lawmaking tool. Of even greater significance to state constitutional law, 
evaluating the constitutionality of the dynamic incorporation of federal law by 
                                                                                                                     
 46 See JAMES A. GARDNER, INTERPRETING STATE CONSTITUTIONS: A JURISPRUDENCE 
OF FUNCTION IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM 18–20 (2005) (arguing for the interpretation of state 
constitutions as a form of resistance against the expansion of federal power).  
 47 See infra Part III.  
 48 See infra Part IV. 
 49 See infra Part III.A.1. 
 50 See Boyd, supra note 37, at 1203. 
 51 See generally CARROLL, supra note 38. 
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states can help us to better understand the inner meaning of separation of 
powers under state constitutions. 
III. NONDELEGATION AS AN EX ANTE CONSTRAINT  
There is little doubt that, if a state legislature were to abdicate its entire 
lawmaking function in a regulatory area to another sovereign, this likely would 
be constitutionally problematic52—at the extreme this could violate the 
Guaranty Clause of the U.S. Constitution.53 Yet it is commonplace for state 
legislatures to borrow from other jurisdictions, especially as they consider and 
adopt uniform laws or model statutes.54 As Thomas Cooley55 and others56 
have recognized that, unlike the U.S. Constitution, which is based on 
enumerated legislative power, state constitutions are premised on legislative 
sovereignty. Drawing on dynamic federal law would thus appear to be at the 
core of a state legislature’s plenary powers to adopt laws as it sees fit.  
For many state courts, however, a special set of constitutional concerns 
arise when a state legislature is not borrowing another state’s law, but 
incorporating the law of the federal government. Judicial decisions in many 
regulatory areas across multiple state jurisdictions suggest that, under the 
constitutions of many states, state legislative incorporation of a dynamic 
                                                                                                                     
 52 For example, consider what would happen if the state of Tennessee passed a statute 
that said that the state “herby adopts all laws adopted by the state of Colorado.” Although 
Justice Brandeis’s notion of state experimentation would envisions a certain amount 
borrowing of legal standards between states, such an abdication of power by the state 
legislature would almost certainly violate basic bilateralism, presentment and other 
legislative enactment provision (such as single subject requirements) in state constitutions. 
I return to some of these specific requirements below, in discussing how state constitutions 
typically protect transparency in the legislative process. See infra Part IV.A. 
 53 Cf. Michael C. Dorf, The Relevance of Federal Norms for State Separation of 
Powers, 4 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 51, 59–67 (1998) (discussing how the Guaranty 
Clause may be justiciable in state court, even if it is not justiciable in federal court, in 
extreme situations, as where a governor cancels elections and declares himself a monarch).  
 54 See supra notes 19–26, 29–30 and accompanying text.  
 55 See generally, e.g., THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATE OF THE AMERICAN 
UNION (1868). Thomas Cooley’s work is considered perhaps the leading treatise of its 
time.  
 56 See, e.g., Daniel B. Rodriguez, State Constitutionalism and the Scope of Judicial 
Review, in NEW FRONTIERS OF STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 61, 78 (James A. Gardner & 
Jim Rossi eds., 2011) (noting that legislative power in states is broad and is subject to 
checks other than judicial review); Robert F. Williams, Comment, On the Importance of a 
Theory of Legislative Power Under State Constitutions, 15 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 57, 60 
(1995) (observing that state legislative power is “plenary,” though also highlighting the 
significance of implied legal limits on its scope). 
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federal law can violate the “nondelegation” doctrine.57 Under the U.S. 
Constitution, the U.S. Supreme Court has not used the nondelegation doctrine 
to strike down a statute since the New Deal,58 though lower courts have done 
so in recent years.59  
State constitutions, however, have their own distinct principles of 
separation of powers and state supreme courts are much more welcoming to 
constitutional challenges under the nondelegation doctrine, especially where 
legislation lacks standards or constraints on future legal change.60 Some state 
courts have held state statutes that rely or draw on federal sources of law 
unconstitutional.61 Even state courts that do not hold these kinds of statutes 
categorically invalid have construed them narrowly, in order to avoid reaching 
a decision that they are unconstitutional.62 In effect, these judicial decisions do 
not authorize state law to be consistent with federal standards absent additional 
legislative action on the part of the state legislature. For many state courts, the 
application of the nondelegation doctrine to legislation adopting federal 
standards is at least as strict as in other settings, such as the delegation to state 
agencies or to private standards board; for some it is even more so.63 This 
approach is not a recent trend, but appears to be a longstanding and accepted 
practice in interpreting state constitutions, particularly in judicial decisions that 
strike down or limit delegations to state agencies that would authorize or 
require a state to adopt federal standards related to health, safety and the 
environment.  
After discussing some categories of examples, I frame this constitutional 
skepticism against delegation to a federal sovereign as a distinct set of cases in 
state separation of powers jurisprudence, distinct from application of the 
nondelegation doctrine in other contexts. I also briefly discuss what might 
motivate this kind of ex ante constraint legislative incorporation of dynamic 
federal law under state constitutions. 
                                                                                                                     
 57 This doctrine derives from the Constitution’s vesting of all legislative powers with 
Congress. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All legislative Powers herein granted shall be 
vested in a Congress of the United States . . . .”). 
 58 See, e.g., A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 537–38 
(1935) (striking down Congress’s delegation to the President to adopt industry-specific 
codes of fair competition). 
 59 See Ass’n of Am. R.Rs. v. Dep’t of Transp., 721 F.3d 666, 667 (D.C. Cir. 2013), 
vacated, 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1234 (2015). 
 60 See, e.g., Rossi, supra note 11, 1190–1201.  
 61 Id. at 1193–97. 
 62 Id. at 1191–93, 1198–1201. 
 63 Id. at 1190–1201. 
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A. Constitutional Challenges to Dynamic Incorporations of Federal 
Law 
The prohibition era appears to be the origin of use of the nondelegation 
doctrine by state courts as a constraint on state uses of federal law. New Deal 
era cases extended the idea, allowing state courts to provide a nondelegation 
antidote to the broad delegations to agencies upheld by the U.S. Supreme 
Court under the U.S. Constitution. Modern cases extend the constitutional 
skepticism about these kinds of delegations to a broad range of regulatory 
fields, including cooperative federalism programs. I summarize each of these 
sets of cases, in turn, discussing their implications for state criminal statutes, 
regulatory statutes, and statutes related to cooperative federalism programs.  
1. Nondelegation Concerns with Dynamic Federal  
Definitions of Crimes 
Following the ratification of the Eighteenth Amendment, federal law 
allowed states to take different approaches to implementing prohibition. Many 
state laws, incorporating by reference the National Prohibition Act (known as 
the “Volstead Act”), were challenged under state constitutions. In many of 
these state supreme court cases, state constitutional structural provisions, 
including separation of powers doctrines such as nondelegation, limited the 
authority of state lawmakers to use federal law to define future crimes relating 
to prohibition. 
For example, the state of Massachusetts passed a statute “to carry into 
effect” the Eighteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.64 Among other 
things, this statute incorporated by reference laws made by Congress and 
federal regulations, allowing the substantive law of the state to automatically 
change in the future to conform to new laws adopted by Congress or new 
regulations adopted by federal agencies.65 Emphasizing how this could allow 
the definition of crimes to change, the state supreme court reasoned that such a 
law is an unconstitutional delegation to the extent that it allows laws to change 
in the future without new legislative adoption by the Massachusetts 
legislature.66 Maine too found unconstitutional amendments to its state liquor 
law that defined as an intoxicating beverage “any beverage containing a 
percentage of alcohol, which by federal enactment, or by decisions of the 
[S]upreme [C]ourt of the United States, now or hereafter declared, renders a 
beverage intoxicating.”67 Although the California Supreme Court reasoned 
that nothing in the California constitution prohibits the state legislature from 
                                                                                                                     
 64 In re Op. of the Justices, 133 N.E. 453, 453–54 (Mass. 1921) (quoting H.B. 1612, 
141st Gen. Ct. (Mass. 1920)). 
 65 Id. at 454. 
 66 Id. 
 67 State v. Intoxicating Liquors, 117 A. 588, 589 (Me. 1922) (quoting 1919 Me. Laws 
309–10).  
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adopting standards based on federal law, the court also “conceded” that 
statutes incorporating federal standards that could change into the future were 
constitutional suspect under separation of powers principles.68  
In addition to raising nondelegation concerns, some state supreme courts 
relied on other constitutional provisions to invalidate prohibition era 
legislation that defined crimes based on federal law. New Mexico adopted law 
that was identical to the California law.69 In rejecting this statute, the New 
Mexico Supreme Court did not hold this to be an unconstitutional delegation.70 
Instead the Court characterized the state legislature’s adoption of the Volstead 
Act as a “flagrant case of blind legislation” in violation of the New Mexico 
constitution’s ban on amending legislation by reference to its title, rather than 
by terms included in the statute.71 By contrast, the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court held that an almost identical state statute was not an unconstitutional 
delegation or a violation of the state’s constitutional prohibition on 
amendatory references.72  
In modern cases involving the use of federal statutes to define crimes, 
many state supreme and appellate courts take a similar approach, holding 
unconstitutional the use of federal law to define future crimes without new 
enactment by the state legislature. A Florida statute specifically described 
certain drugs that were prohibited but also restricted “any other drug to which 
the drug abuse laws of the United States apply.”73 At the time of the statute’s 
adoption in 1967, the hallucinogenic drug STP was not registered by the 
federal government. In 1968 STP appeared in the Federal Register as a 
controlled substance.74 In reviewing the conviction of defendant accused of 
delivering STP under the Florida statute, the state supreme court held it an 
unconstitutional delegation for the state court to apply amendments to the 
federal regulations that occurred after the enactment of the Florida law.75 This 
approach was common to a number of constitutional challenges to drug 
convictions in other jurisdictions too.76  
                                                                                                                     
 68 Ex parte Burke, 212 P. 193, 194 (Cal. 1923).  
 69 State v. Armstrong, 243 P. 333, 353–54 (N.M. 1924) (containing a detailed 
description of state constitution bans on amending legislation by reference). Article IV, 
Section 18 of New Mexico’s Constitution states, “No law shall be revised or amended, or 
the provisions thereof extended by reference to its title only; but each section thereof as 
revised, amended or extended shall be set out in full.” N.M. CONST. art. IV, § 18. 
 70 Armstrong, 243 P. at 353.  
 71 Id. at 353–54. 
 72 Commonwealth v. Alderman, 119 A. 551, 553 (Pa. 1923).  
 73 Freimuth v. State, 272 So. 2d 473, 474 (Fla. 1972) (quoting FLA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 404.01(3)). 
 74 Id.  
 75 Id. at 476. 
 76 See, e.g., People v. Harper. 562 P.2d 1112, 1113 (Colo. 1977); Cilento v. State, 377 
So. 2d 663, 665 (Fla. 1979); Johnston v. State, 181 S.E.2d 42, 64 (Ga. 1971); State v. 
Rodriguez, 379 So. 2d 1084, 1087 (La. 1980); State v. Workman, 183 N.W.2d 911, 913 
(Neb. 1971); State v. Julson, 202 N.W.2d 145, 151 (N.D. 1972); State v. Emery, 45 N.E. 
2016] DYNAMIC INCORPORATION OF FEDERAL LAW 473 
This basic principle has been extended to criminal settings beyond drug 
enforcement context too, primarily to construe narrowly any definition of 
crimes by a state legislature based on dynamic federal law. For example 
Florida’s statutes state: “In any prosecution charging careless or reckless 
operation of aircraft in violation of this section, the court, in determining 
whether the operation was careless or reckless, shall consider the standards for 
safe operation of aircraft as prescribed by federal statutes or regulations 
governing aeronautics.”77 An appellate court hearing a constitutional challenge 
to a prosecution under this statute reasoned that “any attempt to adopt or 
incorporate standards that will arise in the future is unconstitutional as an 
improper delegation of legislative power.”78 As a result, the court held that it 
would only be constitutional for a prosecutor to incorporate into the definition 
of a crime FAA blood alcohol regulations that existed as of 1983, the year the 
statute was enacted.79  
2. Nondelegation Limits on State Agency Incorporation of  
Dynamic Federal Regulations 
The New Deal era and its following years brought on a significant growth 
in agencies at the state as well as the federal level of government.80 As Barry 
Cushman observes, during the New Deal era “courts occasionally found that 
state and federal programs transgressed federalism or nondelegation.”81 Keith 
Whittington’s study of state constitutional law during the New Deal eras 
similarly emphasizes that state courts “regularly heard constitutional 
challenges to how legislators delegated power to other government 
officials.”82 Although Whittington’s data is limited to only four states, his 
analysis shows that challenges to structural aspects of state government were 
                                                                                                                     
319, 320 (Ohio 1896); State v. Welch, 363 A.2d 1356, 1359 (R.I. 1976); State v. Johnson, 
173 N.W.2d 894, 895 (S.D. 1970); State v. Green, 793 P.2d 912, 917 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990); State v. Dougall, 570 P.2d 135, 138 (Wash. 1977); State v. Grinstead, 206 S.E.2d 
912, 920 (W. Va. 1974). 
 77 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 860.13(2) (West 2014).  
 78 Cloyd v. State, 943 So. 2d 149, 163 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006).  
 79 Id. at 164. 
 80 See, e.g., David Freeman Engstrom, The Lost Origins of American Fair 
Employment Law: Regulatory Choice and the Making of Modern Civil Rights, 1943–1972, 
63 STAN. L. REV. 1071, 1079–82 (2011) (describing the growth of state agencies beginning 
in the 1940s as a mechanism for more effectively adjudicating civil rights claims than 
relying on court-centered, private enforcement). 
 81 Barry Cushman, Lost Fidelities, 41 WM. & MARY. L. REV. 95, 116–17 (1999) 
(footnote omitted).  
 82 Keith E. Whittington, State Constitutional Law in the New Deal Period, 67 
RUTGERS U. L. REV. 1141, 1166 (2015).  
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considerably more likely to lead to invalidation of statutes than individual or 
economics rights challenges.83  
Just as the nondelegation doctrine was the center of attention in federal 
constitutional litigation surrounding New Deal era programs adopted by 
Congress, state courts heard nondelegation challenges to new agency 
regulatory programs adopted by state legislatures. State legislatures making 
these delegations to agencies routinely borrowed federal statutes and 
regulations in providing instructions to agency regulators; for example, many 
state programs adopted during the New Deal era were designed and adopted to 
assist in implementation and enforcement in federal regulation or to fill gaps 
given limitations in its jurisdictional reach.  
Some of the earliest constitutional challenges to these programs drew state 
courts into the same battles being fought before the U.S. Supreme Court over 
the constitutionality of federal New Deal programs. For example, New York’s 
Court of Appeals invalidated a state statute that made federal regulation 
promulgated to implement the National Industrial Recovery Act enforceable 
against the intrastate coal trade.84 A New Jersey court held it unconstitutional 
for the state legislature to adopt the National Industrial Recovery Act, 
reasoning that it is “vicious legislation” and that the New Jersey legislature has 
a constitutional obligation to declare the law.85 The Nebraska Supreme Court 
declared unconstitutional a state unemployment and old age pensions law 
because the collection of a tax levied by the statute was made contingent on a 
future act of Congress.86  
In the spirit of these decisions, the use of the nondelegation doctrine to 
invalidate state use of federal law has had a particularly significant impact on 
state labor legislation. A New Deal era Pennsylvania statute providing that a 
                                                                                                                     
 83 Still, he finds that, on the whole, state courts are no less hostile to the expansion of 
regulatory power than are federal courts, noting in particular that state court courts held 
that legislatures “could authorize railroad commissions to determine whether and where to 
require the construction of overhead crossings, authorize alcohol control boards to develop 
rules governing the transportation of alcoholic beverages on state roads, and empower 
courts to review proposed rules developed by conservation boards.” Id. (footnotes omitted) 
(citing cases primarily from Virginia and New Mexico). Whittington’s data is limited to 
only four states, and does not appear to focus on or make any effort to distinguish 
delegations based on federal law, let alone dynamic sources of law. See id. at 1141. 
 84 Darweger v. Staats, 196 N.E. 61, 72 (N.Y. 1935). 
 85 Wilentz v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 172 A. 903, 903 (N.J. 1934). As the court 
reasoned:  
[T]he adoption of the laws of another state or of the nation as a part of our act was 
improper; it cannot be introduced into our legislation by reference. We may adopt the 
spirit, but we can’t make the law by injecting into our statutes a reference to the 
United States Code or Minnesota law and calling it our law. The Legislature must 
establish its own standards; it may follow those created by the Federal Government, 
but it cannot draft them; it must enact them.  
Id. at 904. 
 86 Smithberger v. Banning, 262 N.W. 492, 500 (Neb. 1935).  
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state agency “shall conform” labor schedules to standards to be established in 
the future by federal authorities was declared unconstitutional by the state 
Supreme Court.87 Highlighting the lack of any limiting principle in the 
delegation as well as no procedural opportunity for a hearing before adopting a 
federal standard, the court declared, “A more sweeping abdication of power 
and duty it would be difficult to imagine.”88 Such decisions are hardly 
confined to the New Deal era. In more recent decades, the Oklahoma Supreme 
Court declared unconstitutional on nondelegation grounds a statute 
establishing a prevailing hourly wage for Oklahoma based on a federal 
Department of Labor prevailing wage, without leaving any discretion to reject 
federal standards to the state agency implementing the statute.89 In addition, an 
Oregon appellate court has held that agency incorporation by reference of a 
federal prevailing wage standard is limited to the federal regulation at the time 
the standard was adopted.90  
Beyond state labor statutes, other state regulatory programs that 
incorporate or rely on federal standards have also been invalidated under 
separation of powers principles, often on the grounds that state statutes 
referring to federal legislation are limited to only static sources of federal law, 
as it existed only at the time of the statute’s adoption. A Michigan civil rights 
case held that state legislation or regulations adopting by reference future 
federal statutes and regulations is not constitutional.91 This accords with the 
general approach Michigan courts seem to recognize in interpreting state 
statutes that refer to federal law: “[W]hen a Michigan statute adopts by 
reference a federal law that is subsequently amended, but the Michigan statute 
remains unchanged . . . the Legislature is presumed to have intended to freeze 
the federal law as it was at the time of the original state statute.”92 
Consequently, the Michigan Worker’s Disability Compensation Act, which 
delegated implementation authority to the Director of the Michigan Bureau of 
Worker’s Disability Compensation, could not be interpreted to incorporate 
future amendments to the federal Internal Revenue Code.93  
                                                                                                                     
 87 Holgate Bros. v. Bashore, 200 A. 672, 678 (Pa. 1938). 
 88 Id.  
 89 City of Okla. City v. State ex rel. Okla. Dep’t of Labor, 918 P.2d 26, 28 (Okla. 
1995).  
 90 Coats-Sellers v. State ex rel. Dep’t of Transp., 85 P.3d 881, 885 (Or. Ct. App. 
2004).  
 91 Mich. Prot. & Advocacy Serv., Inc. v. Caruso, 581 F. Supp. 2d 847, 852–53 (W.D. 
Mich. 2008).  
 92 Radecki v. Dir. of Bureau of Worker’s Disability Comp., 526 N.W.2d 611, 614 
(Mich. Ct. App. 1994). 
 93 Id.  
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3. Cooperative Federalism Programs and Constraints on  
Dynamic Incorporation of Federal Law  
Many modern programs involving infrastructure funding or health, safety, 
and environmental regulation are designed to implement cooperative 
federalism, defined broadly as states coordinating their substantive law and 
enforcement policies with overlapping federal standards, goals, and programs. 
Some such programs are tied to “carrots,” such as federal funding—common 
in the transportation and education areas.94 Elsewhere, however, federal 
programs rely on the possibility of preemption by federal regulators as the 
ultimate enforcement “stick”—a common approach under environmental 
statutes such as the Clean Air Act.95 In most regulatory areas with such 
programs, state legislatures have adopted laws to assist the state in enforcing 
or implementing federal standards, often by assigning the primary 
coordinating role to an executive branch agency. 
The Medicaid Act adopted the framework for a cooperative federalism 
program, where the federal government provides contingent funding to states 
to provide medical assistance to persons who lack the income to pay for 
medical care.96 Under Medicaid, for many years Nebraska had provided 
medical services to “caretaker relatives” who were not eligible for federal Aid 
to Dependent Children benefits.97 Although federal law once required these 
“caretaker relative” benefits, later amendments to federal law made them 
optional.98 The Nebraska agency overseeing Medicaid initiated an 
administrative process to eliminate these benefits, leading the Nebraska 
Supreme Court to consider a constitutional challenge to the state agency’s 
elimination of the benefits in Clemens v. Harvey.99 As the Nebraska Supreme 
Court observed, the state statute had incorporated federal Medicaid legislation 
at the time the benefits were mandatory.100 Thus, according to the court it 
would be unconstitutional for a state agency to later conform benefits to new 
federal regulations without new state legislation.101 An ironic effect of this 
                                                                                                                     
 94 See generally Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative 
Federalism: Why State Autonomy Makes Sense and “Dual Sovereignty” Doesn’t, 96 MICH. 
L. REV. 813 (1998) (discussing cooperative federalism programs).  
 95 See generally David L. Markell, The Role of Deterrence-Based Enforcement in a 
“Reinvented” State/Federal Relationship: The Divide Between Theory and Reality, 24 
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (2000) (discussing the Environmental Protection Agency’s 
deterrence-based enforcement and compliance scheme). 
 96 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396–1396s (2012).  
 97 See Jeffery R. Kirkpatrick, Note, Restraining Agency Action: Administrative 
Discretion and Adoption of Statutes by Reference in Clemens v. Harvey, 247 Neb. 77, 525 
N.W.2d 185 (1994), 75 NEB. L. REV. 621, 623–26 (1996).  
 98 Id. at 634–35 (noting how Nebraska law is more restrictive in limiting agency 
discretion than is federal law). 
 99 Clemens v. Harvey, 525 N.W.2d 185, 187 (Neb. 1994).  
 100 Id. at 188.  
 101 Id. at 189.  
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decision was to require Nebraska to fund Medicaid benefits that were no 
longer funded by the federal government, even without explicit legislative 
authorization of their funding. Put another way, the delegation was considered 
unconstitutional, yet was not unconstitutional for the Nebraska Supreme Court 
to require the funding of benefits.  
Perhaps out of recognition that this presents its own potential separation of 
powers concerns, the Nebraska Supreme Court has refused to extend the 
approach of Clemens to other programs that would require the expenditure of 
state funds. For example, the court refused to invalidate a legislative 
delegation to an agency to set income eligibility for child care subsidies based 
on 120% of the federal poverty level, noting that without an income eligibility 
limit subsidies would be expanded to the extent that “the entire program would 
collapse.”102 Perhaps, Clemens can be distinguished to the extent that it 
invoked the nondelegation doctrine to preserve the status quo of program 
funding—effectively requiring the state to provide benefits absent legislative 
authorizing to the contrary. Without eligibility standards, by contrast, the state 
would effectively be forced to expand its program beyond precedent. Perhaps 
it is thus more common that the absence of legislative authorization based on 
federal standards under the nondelegation doctrine works to restrict (not 
expand) programs or the availability of government benefits. Other courts, for 
example, have observed that a lack of a state statute explicitly authorizing 
compliance with specific federal standards could potentially result in a loss of 
funding.103 This problem seems particularly salient for any state programs that 
authorize the spending of federal money, with some states even suggesting that 
federal funding of state programs requires recurring legislative approval.104  
Other cooperative federalism programs are not tied to funding, or carrots, 
but instead rely more significantly on the stick of federal enforcement. Such 
programs exist under the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act, each of which 
provide for federal standards and enforcement where states fail to action that 
                                                                                                                     
 102 Johnsen v. State, 697 N.W.2d 237, 240 (Neb. 2005). 
 103 See, e.g., West Virginia v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 289 F.3d 281, 
293 (4th Cir. 2002).  
 104 While a discussion of state implementation of federal grants under state budgeting 
laws is beyond the scope of this Article, others have highlighted how federal preemption 
might work to address some of the problems presented by state legislatures that, due to 
inaction in authorizing expenditure, refuse to spend federal grants. See, e.g., George D. 
Brown, Federal Funds and National Supremacy: The Role of State Legislatures in Federal 
Grant Programs, 28 AM. U. L. REV. 279, 281 (1979) (suggesting that, at core, state grant-in 
aid expenditure are a federal law, not subject to state constitutional limits where the federal 
government has assigned a designate in the state executive branch to spend these 
resources); Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Dissecting the State: The Use of Federal Law to Free 
State and Local Officials from State Legislatures’ Control, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1201, 1201 
(1999) (evaluating when federal law can delegate federal powers to specific state or local 
institutions, even against the will of a state legislature).  
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meets minimum expectations under federal law.105 Another example is the 
national program for regulating hazardous waste under the Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), adopted in 1976.106 This program 
authorizes each state to develop its own program consistent with the minimum 
federal standards, but also gives states the flexibility to adopt more rigorous 
waste disposal standards.  
The Texas Solid Waste Disposal Act, enacted in 1989 to implement 
RCRA, criminalizes transportation and storage of “hazardous waste,” defined 
as “solid waste identified or listed as a hazardous waste” by the federal 
Environmental Protection Agency under RCRA.107 In Ex parte Elliot, a Texas 
appellate court hearing a constitutional challenge to this statute construed this 
statute to allow incorporation by reference of the EPA standard at the time of 
the statute’s enactment, but not afterwards.108 The court reasoned that 
allowing the definition of hazardous waste to “change from time to time at the 
will of the EPA . . . [would] place in doubt the constitutionality” of the 
statute.109  
The approach of Texas to this issue stands in contrast to the approach 
taken by Louisiana courts in reviewing similar state legislation that 
incorporates federal standards under RCRA. According to Louisiana’s 
Supreme Court, a state statute defining hazardous waste based on federal 
RCRA standards is not an unconstitutional delegation because the Louisiana 
legislature retains its authority to modify hazardous waste laws in lieu of 
RCRA’s program.110 Although the Louisiana Supreme Court acknowledged 
that RCRA would dictate the minimum requirements in the state, the state 
legislature retains the power to adopt “more stringent” requirements.111 In 
Louisiana, delegation to an agency allowed the legislature to continue to 
exercise oversight and monitoring of the agency’s discretion, even though that 
discretion included the authority to incorporate minimum federal standards 
under RCRA.  
B. Nondelegation as a Resistance Norm  
The constitutional practice of using the nondelegation doctrine to reject a 
state legislature’s choice to incorporate dynamic federal law might be 
defended to the extent that it allows state separation of powers to serve as a 
“resistance norm” of sorts to the use of vertical sources of sovereignty in state 
                                                                                                                     
 105 See Markell, supra note 95, at 10, 30; see also ERIN RYAN, FEDERALISM AND THE 
TUG OF WAR WITHIN 156–62 (2011). 
 106 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901–6992k (2012).  
 107 TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 361.003(12) (West 2010). 
 108 Ex parte Elliott, 973 S.W.2d 737, 742–43 (Tex. App. 1998).  
 109 Id. at 741. 
 110 State v. All Pro Paint & Body Shop, Inc., 639 So. 2d 707, 720 (La. 1994).  
 111 Id. at 717–18 n.16.  
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lawmaking.112 James Gardner has argued that state courts ought to serve as 
“agents of federalism”113 in interpreting their constitutions, and nondelegation 
approaches to rejecting dynamic federal law might similarly be understood to 
protect against unwanted intrusion of federal sovereignty into the legislative 
lawmaking process.114 Whatever benefits may be advanced by fixating on 
state sovereignty, in effect this view invites state courts to use their 
constitutions to erect an ex ante limit to a state legislature drawing on federal 
sources of law or on cooperative federalism, instead favoring parochial notions 
of state sovereignty—even where a state legislature has made a different 
political choice. 
Every time the nondelegation doctrine is used to invalidate legislation, it 
may be said to impose an ex ante constraint on lawmaking. This kind of 
resistance norm, however, appears to be special to delegations involving 
federal law, going above and beyond ordinary constitutional constraints on 
legislative delegations in states. Interestingly, state courts seem to routinely 
reference a lack of standards or loss of control over relying on future federal 
law. These same states, however, also seem willing to authorize state agencies 
or local governments to adopt regulations under similarly broad delegations 
without raising the same constitutional concerns. In this sense, the 
nondelegation concerns with dynamic incorporation of federal law seem to be 
driven by a concern about a state losing control over the constraining 
principles for a delegation to some sovereign outside of a state. Moreover, they 
seem to reflect a special concern about loss of control to the federal 
government, without a state’s legislature approving the specific federal 
standard at issue.  
Interestingly, states have authorized fairly broad delegations to private 
bodies, such as the American Medical Association, in workers’ compensation 
claims, without holding statutes unconstitutional under the nondelegation 
doctrine. Consider, for example, a New Mexico workers’ compensation statute 
requiring “use of the most recent edition of the AMA Guide in evaluating 
impairment.”115 The New Mexico Supreme Court rejected a nondelegation 
                                                                                                                     
 112 I borrow the term “resistance norm” from Ernest A. Young, Constitutional 
Avoidance, Resistance Norms, and the Preservation of Judicial Review, 78 TEX. L. REV. 
1549, 1552–53 (2000), wherein the author evaluates judicially created constitutional 
avoidance canons. Although the idea of resistance norms is commonly discussed today in 
the context of the U.S. Constitution, the role such norms should play in interpreting state 
constitutions is largely unexplored.  
 113 See, e.g., James A. Gardner, State Courts as Agents of Federalism: Power and 
Interpretation in State Constitutional Law, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1725, 1731–32 
(2003).  
 114 Although James Gardner does not frame state constitutions as providing “resistance 
norms,” the role of state constitutional rights as providing a form of resistance against the 
expansion of federal power is discussed in James A. Gardner, State Constitutional Rights 
as Resistance to National Power: Toward a Functional Theory of State Constitutions, 91 
GEO. L.J. 1003, 1003–04 (2003).  
 115 Madrid v. St. Joseph Hosp., 928 P.2d 250, 256 (N.M. 1996).  
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challenge to this statute, noting that the AMA’s standards were “periodically 
subject to revision, in limited circumstances such as where the standards are 
issued by a well-recognized, independent authority, and provide guidance on 
technical and complex matters within the entity’s area of expertise.”116 
Notably, these same state courts do not tend to afford similar deference to the 
independence or expertise of federal agencies.  
Concerns with a lack of state-centered controls on legal change also 
appear to motivate these kinds of resistance norms against the use of federal 
sovereignty. Most notably, these cases seem to place emphasis on prohibiting 
the use of prospective federal law without explicit authorization by the 
legislature, as a way of protecting citizens from legal change without some 
additional process or notice. These may well be valid concerns, as I discuss 
below, though it is not clear why a constitutional nondelegation doctrine is 
necessary to address it here when it is not necessary in other areas. In effect, 
this kind of constitutional restriction can serve to freeze in place federal 
regulation for state criminal and regulatory standards, and disable cooperative 
federalism programs. By increasing the costs of dynamic regulation, that can 
evolve and adapt to new information and regulatory circumstances, this 
approach to nondelegation thus serves to resist legal change where the primary 
source of that change is national, not the state as sovereign.  
IV. REASSESSING DYNAMIC INCORPORATION OF FEDERAL LAW FOR 
STATE SEPARATION OF POWERS AND FEDERALISM  
As Walter F. Dodd remarked, “A constitution must be judged not by its 
name, but by the function which it has to perform.”117 On its own terms, state 
separation of powers serves many functions without a state system of 
government, including improving transparency, preserving accountability, and 
protecting against arbitrariness in lawmaking. Gauged against these bedrock 
values, it is unclear why an ex ante prohibition on legislative incorporation of 
dynamic sources of federal law is necessary. The incorporation of dynamic 
sources of federal law should survive constitutional challenge whenever the 
ultimate authority to effect rights and duties with federal law is assigned to an 
accountable intermediary, such as a court or state agency. Moreover, to the 
extent that some identifiable legislative constraint allows for monitoring the 
delegation, whether that constraint comes from state or federal law, even the 
most rigorous nondelegation standard would seem to be met. I argue that 
nondelegation constraints here are not necessary but may be harmful to some 
of the purposes of separation of powers and federalism, to the extent that the 
incorporation of dynamic federal law provides state legislatures a way to make 
                                                                                                                     
 116 Id. (quoting Bd. of Trs. of the Emps.’ Ret. Sys. of the City of Baltimore v. Mayor & 
City Council of Balt., 562 A.2d 720, 731 (Md. 1989)). For similar analysis, see McCabe v. 
N.D. Workers Comp. Bureau, 567 N.W.2d 201, 204–05 (N.D. 1997); and Tenn. Op. Att’y 
Gen. No. 08-75, 2008 WL 913288, at *1–4 (2008).  
 117 W.F. Dodd, The Function of a State Constitution, 30 POL. SCI. Q. 201, 215 (1915).  
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both state agencies and courts more, not less, relevant to the development of 
federal law.  
A. Transparency: Self-Contained Statutes and Contingent Legislation 
Many state constitutional provisions are aimed at ensuring that the state 
legislative process is transparent. Transparency serves the important separation 
of powers function of ensuring that legislators are actually aware of the 
particular laws that they are asked to vote for.118 In addition, transparency 
serves to better inform citizens, which improves their ability to monitor the 
voting records of legislators.119 Perhaps of greatest significance, transparency 
in the legislative process serves to give citizens notice of laws, so that they are 
not blindsided by legislative prohibitions or requirements of consequence 
without some communication and opportunity to conform prior to 
enforcement.120  
While transparency is an important value to the general principle of 
separation of powers, state constitutions contain a number of explicit 
protections designed to enhance legislative transparency—many of which go 
beyond the requirements of the U.S. Constitution or Congress’s legislative 
process. Consider a ban on legislation or statewide initiatives that do not 
comply with single subject rule requirements, which appears in more than two 
dozen state constitutions.121 At least in theory, such bans serve to advance 
transparency, but in practice single subject requirements have been a notorious 
“source of uncertainty and inconsistency” for state legislatures and citizens.122 
As Richard Briffault puts it, “The notion of a subject is inherently incapable of 
precise definition.”123 While these constitutional bans on legislation containing 
multiple topics would appear to limit legislative flexibility to enact statutes 
addressing complex topics, courts interpreting these provisions have often 
adopted a presumption in favor of constitutionality so long as all of a statute’s 
provisions are “reasonably germane.”124  
Another express state constitutional prohibition designed to enhance 
transparency is the limit on amending laws through the use of referential 
                                                                                                                     
 118 See Daniel B. Rodriguez, Localism and Lawmaking, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 627, 651–52 
(2001). 
 119 See id. at 667. 
 120 See id. at 652. 
 121 See generally Rachael Downey et al., A Survey of the Single Subject Rule as 
Applied to Statewide Initiatives, 13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 579 (2004).  
 122 Michael D. Gilbert, Single Subject Rules and the Legislative Process, 67 U. PITT. L. 
REV. 803, 803 (2006).  
 123 Richard Briffault, The Item Veto in State Courts, 66 TEMP. L. REV. 1171, 1177 
(1993).  
 124 Daniel H. Lowenstein, California Initiatives and the Single-Subject Rule, 30 UCLA 
L. REV. 936, 936–57 (1983).  
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legislation, a ban that appears in the roughly twenty state constitutions.125 
Consider the modern Michigan Constitution, which states: “No law shall be 
revised, altered or amended by reference to its title only. The section or 
sections of the act altered or amended shall be re-enacted and published at 
length.”126 As Michigan Chief Justice Thomas Cooley (also a leading 
authority on state constitutions127) explained in addressing the same language 
in a previous state constitution:  
The mischief designed to be remedied was the enactment of amendatory 
statutes in terms so blind that legislators themselves were sometimes 
deceived in regard to their effect, and the public, from the difficulty in 
making the necessary examination and comparison, failed to become apprised 
of the changes made in the laws. An amendatory act which purported only to 
insert certain words, or to substitute one phrase for another in an act or 
section which was only referred to but not republished, was well calculated to 
mislead the careless as to its effect, and was, perhaps, sometimes drawn in 
that form for that express purpose. Endless confusion was thus introduced 
into the law, and the constitution wisely prohibited such legislation.128 
Many of the cases that purport to strike down legislation that incorporate 
dynamic federal law raise these same types of concerns. Some of these cases 
seem to rely just as much on state constitutional bans on referential legislation 
as they do on the nondelegation doctrine under general separation of powers 
principles.129 It is not clear that constitutional bans on referential statutes, in 
those states that have them, would necessarily limit the ability of a state to rely 
on or incorporate future federal law, so long as a statute is considered 
complete on its own terms.130 Still, for states that do endorse these kinds of 
constitutional bans, it simply is not necessary to rely on general separation of 
                                                                                                                     
 125 Typically this takes the form of a constitutional provision to the effect that no act 
shall be revised or amended by reference to its title only. See Brabner-Smith, supra note 
28, at 199 n.1 (describing such language in constitutions of Arizona, California, Florida, 
Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, Mississippi, 
Nevada, Oregon, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, and West Virginia).  
 126 MICH. CONST. art. IV, § 25 (1963) (current). This exact language, with slightly 
different punctuation, also appears in Article IV, Section 25 of the 1850 Michigan 
Constitution, MICH. CONST. art. IV, § 25 (1850), and Article V, Section 21 of the 1908 
Michigan Constitution, MICH. CONST. art. V, § 21 (1908) .  
 127 See generally COOLEY, supra note 55. 
 128 People ex rel. Drake v. Mahaney, 13 Mich. 481, 497 (1865) (discussing Article IV, 
Section 25 of the 1850 Michigan Constitution).  
 129 See supra notes 125–128 and accompanying text (discussing examples). 
 130 See Brabner-Smith, supra note 28, at 199 (“If the new act is complete in itself, it 
will be upheld although it amends another statute by implication.”); see also People ex rel. 
Cant v. Crossley, 103 N.E. 537, 544 (Ill. 1913) (holding that a referential statute is valid as 
long as it is a “complete act” and is “intelligible” without having to “read into the new law 
certain provisions of prior statutes”).  
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powers principles or nondelegation constraints in order to enhance 
transparency.  
Moreover, it seems important to assess whether the transparency concerns 
with relying on opaque sources of law expressed by Cooley in the late 
nineteenth century131—a time when external sources of law may have been 
law that was difficult to track down—hold true in modern state lawmaking. 
Such concerns seem significant for sources of law that are not widely 
disseminated, warranting a particular judicial skepticism in evaluating 
legislative incorporation of private standards. However, any concern with the 
incorporation of private standards simply does not extend to the incorporation 
of federal law. Federal legal pronouncements are widely disseminated and 
accessible to the public at large through the Federal Statutes, the Code of 
Federal Regulation, the Federal Register and federal agency websites. Even 
when the concern with the incorporation of federal law is framed as a concern 
about regulatory change, in areas where conduct is already regulated by the 
federal government, it would seem that any entity subject to some federal 
regulation would already have notice of any changes that occur through the 
federal lawmaking process. It is not clear why separation of powers principles 
are necessary to protect the public’s notice or reliance interests, especially 
when statutory publication requirements, administrative procedure, and 
constitutional due process already provide substantial protections.  
In addition, it bears noting that many state statutes incorporating dynamic 
sources of federal law are examples of what is commonly considered 
“contingent legislation.”132 Contingent legislation occurs when a legislative 
body creates a law and provides that all of it takes effect only upon the 
happening of a given fact or identifiable future contingency, often to be 
determined by an agency to whom authority has been delegated.133 The first 
nondelegation case decided by the U.S. Supreme Court involved a statute 
providing that a trade restriction was to remain in effect unless the President 
declared by proclamation that the relevant country (here Great Britain) had 
ceased to violate the neutral commerce of the U.S.134 States appear to follow a 
similar approach, often in situations that draw on federal law. For example, 
Alabama’s Supreme Court rejected a separation of powers challenge to a 
statute that depends on future federal funding.135 Kansas’s Supreme Court 
rejected a similar challenge to a statute that depends on the passage of future 
                                                                                                                     
 131 See supra note 55. 
 132 See Samuel Mermin, “Cooperative Federalism” Again: State and Municipal 
Legislation Penalizing Violation of Existing and Future Federal Requirements: I, 57 YALE 
L.J. 1, 9 (1947). 
 133 See id. 
 134 See, e.g., The Cargo of the Brig Aurora v. United States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 382, 
383 (1813).  
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484 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 77:2 
legislation by Congress.136 The Oklahoma Supreme Court upheld a separation 
of powers challenge to a statute that was contingent on the outcome of future 
federal court determinations.137  
In such contexts any delegation related to a dynamic source of federal law 
does not automatically affect any rights or duties; rather, it depends on an 
independent future fact or identifiable event, so there is arguably no separation 
of powers violation. As Gary Lawson has reasoned, such legislation is 
commonplace to the extent that every statute contains an effective date, and 
“there is no evident reason why that effective date cannot be determined by 
some event other than celestial motions.”138 Thus, conditioning the operative 
legal effect of legislation on the happening of an identifiable future event is 
not, in itself, an unconstitutional delegation of power—even when the event is 
determined by the decision of a legal entity external to the jurisdiction.139  
For example, consider a state statute that instructs a state banking 
regulator to apply a particular set of regulations based on whether a bank is a 
member of the Federal Reserve System or the bank exercises powers 
authorized under the Federal Reserve Act “and amendments thereto.”140 To 
the extent that this state’s standard is triggered by an identifiable future event, 
such as a bank’s Federal Reserve membership, it would seem to fall in the 
category of contingent legislation and not raise any separation of powers issue 
at all. Even the portions of the statute that provide for regulation of banks that 
exercise the same powers as banks under the Federal Reserve Act141—which 
appears to place the contingency in the hands of federal rather than state 
regulators—gives clear and transparent criteria that can be observed in the 
future as a basis for regulation. Following a similar line of reasoning, even 
some states with explicit bans on referential legislation have interpreted these 
to allow incorporation of federal standards as triggering or definitional terms 
                                                                                                                     
 136 State v. Dumler, 559 P.2d 798, 804 (Kan. 1977) (holding that a provision in a 
statute regulating highway speeds that expires on a future date when Congress removes all 
restrictions on maximum speeds limits is not an adoption of future federal legislation or an 
unconstitutional delegation). 
 137 Gibson Prods. Co. v. Murphy, 100 P.2d 453, 457 (Okla. 1940) (upholding a 
provision of the Oklahoma Unemployment Compensation Act that suspends the statute if 
the Federal Social Security Act is declared invalid).  
 138 Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 327, 364 (2002). 
 139 See Diversified Inv. P’ship v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 775 P.2d 947, 950 
(Wash. 1989) (concluding that a state statutory provision that declares itself invalid if it 
conflicts with a federal Medicaid property reimbursement is not a future incorporation of 
federal law or an unconstitutional transfer of power); see also People v. Parker, 359 N.E.2d 
348, 352 (N.Y. 1976) (noting that New York’s definition of “felony” applies to crimes to 
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 140 The example, common to the dual banking approach of many states, is from 
Brabner-Smith, supra note 28, at 204.  
 141 See id. at 203–04.  
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in state law, as long as the statute is otherwise considered complete within 
itself.142 
B. Accountability and Dynamic Federal Law 
As John Hart Ely has observed, “[t]hat legislators often find it convenient 
to escape accountability is precisely the reason for a nondelegation 
doctrine.”143 Relying exclusively on state law in adopting statutes may 
reinforce one narrow type of political accountability—based on state 
sovereignty—but legislative incorporation of dynamic federal law advances a 
different kind of political accountability. In addition, to the extent state 
incorporation of dynamic federal law relies on accountable intermediaries, 
states can bolster accountability even further—alleviating most separation of 
powers concerns in jurisdictions that require only political safeguards to 
support a legislative delegation.  
1. Intrinsic Accountability Benefits to the Incorporation of  
Dynamic Federal Law 
One set of accountability concerns focuses on encouraging legislators to 
adopt more specific statutes. More specificity in statutes helps to ensure that 
major policy choices are made by elected officials, and that these elected 
principals have some ongoing basis through statutes for monitoring the agents 
to whom they have delegated authority. Another set of accountability concerns 
relates to the comparative political accountability of the legislature vis-à-vis 
the executive branch. Both concerns seem largely inapplicable to state 
legislative adoption of dynamic federal law; indeed, there may be reasons to 
think that this kind of incorporation produces more accountability benefits 
than relying entirely on state sources of law.  
Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule observe how it is commonly assumed 
that nondelegation doctrines can enhance accountability through enhancing 
legislative updates of statutes, since “[u]nder the nondelegation doctrine, 
Congress will enact narrow statutes in order to avoid reversal by the 
courts.”144 Recent empirical work by Jed Stiglitz, however, shows that 
enforcement of nondelegation limits on legislative power can lead to clearer or 
                                                                                                                     
 142 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Alderman, 119 A. 551, 552–53 (Pa. 1923) (holding 
constitutional a statute defining “intoxicating liquor” based on federal law similar to the 
Maine statute, discussed supra note 67 and accompanying text, but finding that there was 
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 143 JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 133 (1980). 
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more complete statutes or to more frequent updating of laws.145 Even if the 
nondelegation doctrine did have the practical effect of making legislation more 
specific, it is not clear that dynamic federal law presents a special challenge in 
this regard—any more so than delegation to state administrative agencies 
under fairly open-ended grants of authority that, in effect, allow state agencies 
to adopt dynamic sources of law through the agency rulemaking process.  
Aside from more specific statutes, which might enhance the accountability 
of majoritarian lawmaking, perhaps a broader accountability benefit of the 
nondelegation doctrine is that, by keeping exercises of legislative power in 
majoritarian bodies, this can help to reduce powerful interest group influence 
in lawmaking. Those who attribute this kind of accountability benefit to the 
nondelegation doctrine may be concerned with how interest groups can 
manipulate the legislative process and, through delegation, vest lawmaking 
with an agent that will be more susceptible to capture than a state 
legislature.146 The general argument is that the best way to protect this kind of 
accountability is to make sure that political choices are made only by political 
principles with electoral accountability in a majoritarian political process.147 
David Schoenbrod, for example, argues that without a strong nondelegation 
doctrine to ensure that only Congress makes legislative choices, members of 
Congress will “evade[] responsibility”148 for the laws they adopt, passing 
blame to those to whom they have delegated legislative power under sweeping 
grants of authority.149  
It is not at all clear, however, that a legislature’s delegation necessarily 
reduces political accountability, especially to the extent that delegation is 
assigned to an agent with equal or greater democratic accountability than the 
legislative principle. As Jerry Mashaw has observed, delegation can clarify 
ultimate responsibility for decisions.150 In particular, Congress’s delegation to 
the executive branch may produce greater accountability to the national 
electorate—overcoming some of the decision-making obstacles faced by a 
                                                                                                                     
 145 See Jed Stiglitz, The Limits of Judicial Control and the Nondelegation Doctrine 23–
24 (Cornell Legal Studies Research Paper No. 15-21, 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
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faction-driven Congress.151 Many political scientists see formal divisions of 
power as rendered irrelevant by the rise of political parties, especially at the 
national level of governance, similarly recognizing that political accountability 
can take many different forms.152  
Looking to state legislative incorporation of dynamic federal law, two sets 
of mechanisms may intrinsically reinforce this kind of political accountability. 
First is representative democracy in national lawmaking process through 
federalism. Since the content of future federal law is determined in a 
representative national political process, a state delegating to future federal 
choices is, in effect, opting to participate in a national political process in 
which the state has only representative democratic participation, not 
lawmaking control. In the context of evaluating supranational lawmaking, 
some have argued that this alone may be sufficient to ensure accountability.153 
To a degree, representative lawmaking in a national political process may 
serve as a substitute for having a state legislature decide every issue itself, 
entirely under state law.  
Beyond representation in the process of federalism, another way that 
incorporation of dynamic federalism intrinsically can enhance accountability is 
through the nature of the national lawmaking process. A national political 
process may be preferable to state legislators insofar as, through the 
participation in national politics or in national regulatory proceedings, interest 
groups that are able to manipulate or control lawmaking at the state level are 
not as effective and see their influence diluted, vis-à-vis what would occur 
through state lawmaking.154 For example, where a state legislature chooses to 
incorporate dynamic federal law, as opposed to delegate discretion to a state 
agency to make a substantive choice independent of federal law, concerns with 
capture of an agency decision-making process would seem to be at their 
lowest: the ability of any powerful interest group to capture regulation 
becomes more difficult the more national the range of interests reflected in the 
decision-making process.155 Likewise, in many instances delegation to a 
                                                                                                                     
 151 See generally Mashaw, supra note 150, at 98; JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS 
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 155 Id. at 1380–81. 
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federal agency would increase the likelihood that the ultimate substantive 
decisions in a regulatory area reflect expertise or science, rather than mere 
political preference.156 Thus to the extent that the quality of the decision-
making process and expertise are central to accountability, state incorporation 
of dynamic sources of federal law can have distinct accountability advantages 
over a state legislature drawing entirely on state law.  
2. “Accountable Intermediaries” as Safeguards in Institutional Design 
Beyond these intrinsic mechanisms enhancing accountability, many states 
incorporating dynamic federal law only allow for this to have a binding legal 
effect following approval by an accountable intermediary, i.e., a particular 
agent of state government.157 In this sense, institutional design can plant 
procedural safeguards to ensure that any dynamic use of federal law is 
accountable to the state political process.  
Many state courts have recognized the significance of an accountable 
intermediary to separation of powers analysis. In upholding a delegation for a 
California agency to only issue licenses consistent with federal law, the 
California Supreme Court emphasized that this decision was only made 
following adjudication and a determination that federal law was consistent 
with and carried out the purposes of the California statute.158 Notably, for the 
California Supreme Court, the independent judgment of an accountable 
intermediary—here an agency subject to procedural safeguards under 
California law—helped to ensure that the use of federal law was consistent 
with California’s statutes. The court upheld the statute against a constitutional 
challenge asserting an unconstitutional delegation to the state agency, along 
with a challenge asserting that this was an unconstitutional delegation to 
Congress and to the U.S. Secretary of Agriculture.159 
A similar approach was taken by the Missouri Supreme Court, in 
upholding a criminal prosecution under a state statute for illegal possession of 
pentazocine, an opioid drug.160 In January 1979, the Federal Drug 
Enforcement Agency (DEA) placed pentazocine on the schedule IV list of 
controlled substances. One month later, the Missouri Division of Health 
followed this approach.161 Missouri’s Supreme Court held this constitutional, 
rejecting a nondelegation challenge to the statute under which state regulators 
restricted the drug. As the court observed, the statute required a state agency to 
                                                                                                                     
 156 Cf. id. (discussing how state legislating is more susceptible to “rent-seeking” by 
interest groups).  
 157 See e.g., Boyd, supra note 37, at 1265 (discussing the ability of the state agent, as 
an accountable intermediary, to issue marketing licenses after determining the “federal 
regulations carried out the purposes of the state act and conformed to its standards”). 
 158 Brock v. Superior Court, 71 P.2d 209, 213 (Cal. 1937).  
 159 Id. 
 160 State v. Thompson, 627 S.W.2d 298, 300–03 (Mo. 1982). 
 161 Id. at 299. 
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use rulemaking to consider whether or not to restrict the drug, based in part on 
how the DEA treated it and also applying other state-specified statutory 
criteria.162 In this sense, the DEA’s treatment of the drug was not 
determinative in terms of its legal effect on Missouri law, as it did not 
automatically create a state law or have a legally binding effect. Instead, the 
primary effect of the DEA’s treatment of a drug was to trigger mandatory 
consideration by the Missouri regulations, who retained some discretion in 
deciding whether to follow it or not.163  
As the California and Missouri cases highlight, state legislatures have 
some opportunities through delegation to an agency to use federal law to 
create trigger regulatory consideration, define relevant criteria, and create 
presumptions. Ultimately state agency regulators, or courts enforcing state 
law, would need some independent basis in state law to make a federal 
standard binding, thus allowing for continued ability for the legislature to 
monitor any changes in the law. This might be considered as a form of 
contingent legislation, but unlike other forms of lawmaking that depend on an 
event over which a state has no control whatsoever,164 here the contingency is 
subject to a decision of an public entity that can be managed by a state’s 
legislature, or an “accountable intermediary.”  
Michael Dorf has recognized the significance of accountable 
intermediaries in enhancing accountability in his assessment of dynamic 
incorporation of foreign law.165 Political safeguards associated with allowing a 
state agency approval authority over adopting future changes under federal 
law, subject to adjudication or rulemaking procedures under state law, may 
help to ensure better accountability in state lawmaking.166 Such a process, 
though involving a functionally irrevocable use of federal law, does not affect 
legal rights based on federal law without some accountable intermediary first 
making a decision under a specified decision-making process that contains 
procedural safeguards, thus leaving both a state legislature and courts some 
continued opportunity to monitor—and to disapprove—the use of federal 
law.167 An established precedent for such an approach appears to exist under 
                                                                                                                     
 162 Id. at 302; see also id. at 301 n.2 (observing that the federal action was not the 
determinative factor, but instead that state standards specified in the statute must be 
applied).  
 163 Id. at 303.  
 164 See supra notes 132–42 and accompanying text (discussing contingent legislation).  
 165 See Dorf, supra note 9, at 153–57.  
 166 Id. at 108 n.13 (in addition to Missouri, Dorf notes cases from Alabama, Arkansas 
and Minnesota that endorse a similar approach).  
 167 Perhaps most significantly, these safeguards will include state administrative 
procedure. Although presumably any adoption of federal law would be subject to the same 
procedures that apply to the adoption of other agency regulations, the 2010 Model State 
Administrative Procedures Act contains a provision that addresses incorporation by 
reference, noting that a rule “may incorporate by reference all or any part of a code, 
standard, or rule that has been adopted by an agency of the United States.” REVISED 
MODEL STATE ADMIN. PROCEDURE ACT § 314 (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. 
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the banking laws of many states, which routinely delegate to state agencies the 
power to determine when federal bank powers should extend to state banks.168 
C. Nonarbitrariness in Dynamic Federal Law and “Hard Look 
Federalism” 
Absent the nondelegation doctrine, one concern is that agency decisions 
would be subject to capture by private interest groups. Perhaps this is one 
reason courts, at both the federal and state levels of government, have 
expressed a particular concern with delegations of lawmaking authority to 
private bodies.169 More generally, without a nondelegation doctrine, agency 
decisions may stray from Congress’s preferences and, worse yet, be made on 
some arbitrary basis. As Tom Merrill puts it, “What matters is that someone, 
somewhere, supplies a standard for the exercise of administrative discretion 
and that the courts can enforce this standard.”170 
Today it is well recognized that the administrative process coupled with 
judicial review is designed to address this kind of concern. Kenneth Culp 
Davis famously celebrated how judicial review provides limiting principle to 
constrain agency discretion, thus minimizing the arbitrariness of agency 
decisions.171 As Lisa Bressman has suggested in her assessment of modern 
judicial review, fixating entirely on political ideals such as participation and 
accountability may overlook how the avoidance of arbitrary governmental 
decision-making also lies at the core of constitutional structure and 
administrative law.172 Bressman maintains that courts’ attention to agency 
decision-making procedures, such as the use of notice and comment 
rulemaking, can help to serve as some safeguard against arbitrary 
                                                                                                                     
STATE LAWS 2010). Some state APA’s specifically provide for an abbreviated rulemaking 
process where federal standards are adopted. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 120.54(6) (West 
Supp. 2016) (providing for a 14-day comment period for the adoption of federal standards, 
which can become effect 21 days after proposed—in contrast to a 28 to 90 day period for 
ordinary notice and comment rules—and requiring a state agency to repeal any federal 
regulation that is repealed, remanded or revoked, as well as respond to any “substantially 
amended” federal regulation).  
 168 See Schroeder, supra note 26, at 206 (observing that eighty-three percent of states 
delegate such powers to state agencies). 
 169 See, e.g., A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 537–38 
(1935) (striking down Congress’s delegation to the President to adopt industry-specific 
codes of fair competition); Tex. Boll Weevil Eradication Found., Inc. v. Lewellen, 952 
S.W.2d 454, 457 (Tex. 1997) (striking state legislative delegation to private board).  
 170 Thomas W. Merrill, Delegation and Judicial Review, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
73, 73 (2010).  
 171 Kenneth Culp Davis argued, for example, that the constitutional nondelegation 
doctrine is met as long as an agency decision-making process is subject to safeguards, 
including judicial review. See Kenneth Culp Davis, A New Approach to Delegation, 36 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 713, 725–30 (1969).  
 172 See generally Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and 
Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461 (2003).  
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governmental decisions.173 However, she also argues that attention to 
procedure alone will not always be sufficient; instead, courts also need to 
gauge an agency’s decision against some “intelligible principle” or other legal 
standards to help monitor and protect against arbitrary agency lawmaking.174 
In federal administrative law, the common mechanism for this is arbitrary and 
capricious review, by which a court assesses whether an agency 
has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely 
failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation 
for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so 
implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product 
of agency expertise.175  
Aaron Saiger has highlighted how, just as their federal counterparts 
engage in arbitrary and capricious review of agencies, so too do state courts—
and perhaps even more so given the institutional character of state 
governments.176 Where the adoption or use of dynamic federal law, or its 
immediate effect, depends on the future decision of a state administrative 
agency, review of whether the agency has abused its discretion in making that 
decision is typically available under state law.177 To the extent the 
nondelegation doctrine serves to ensure that there are some legal standards that 
constrain the discretion of agencies in making these decisions,178 it is 
important to evaluate whether any standards—procedural or substantive—
serve to cabin agency decision-making. In almost every case involving state 
incorporation of dynamic federal law by a state agency, some identifiable and 
relatively fixed source standard can allow state courts to monitor whether 
                                                                                                                     
 173 Id. at 541–45. 
 174 Id. at 532–33 (citing Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 472–73 
(2001)).  
 175 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 
(1983).  
 176 See generally Aaron Saiger, Chevron and Deference in State Administrative Law, 
83 FORDHAM L. REV. 555 (2014) (discussing why basing Chevron deference on 
accountability does not neatly project onto the institutional features of state agencies). For 
discussion of the institutional factors Saiger highlights that make state courts more likely to 
use exacting arbitrary and capricious review than their federal counterparts, such as the 
presence of elected judges, see Jim Rossi, Overcoming Parochialism: State Administrative 
Procedure and Institutional Design, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 551, 557–59 (2001).  
 177 For purposes of the discussion in this Article, I use the terms “abuse of discretion” 
(a more general, non statutory standard of review) and “arbitrary and capricious review” (a 
specific standard that applies to review of certain agency decisions under state 
administrative procedure acts) interchangeably. The core suggestions I make regarding the 
operation of arbitrariness review could apply under either review standard.  
 178 Cf. Davis, supra note 171, at 713 and accompanying text.  
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agency decision-making is arbitrary.179 In fact, this kind of arbitrary and 
capricious review can afford state courts an opportunity to engage their federal 
counterparts on the meaning of federal statutes. Such an approach enhances 
the role of states in interpreting federal statutes in comparison to treating the 
nondelegation doctrine as an ex ante limit on dynamic incorporation of federal 
law, which relegates states an only passive role on the sidelines in interpreting 
federal law.  
1. Grounding Judicial Review in State Law 
A few state courts have recognized that the functions of separation of 
powers would not be advanced by striking as unconstitutional the 
incorporation of dynamic federal law, at least in instances where a state 
legislature has provided some specific criteria to constrain how state agencies 
can use federal law. For example, an Ohio appellate court rejected a 
constitutional challenge to an Ohio Public Utilities Commission regulation that 
incorporates a Department of Transportation regulation banning transportation 
of hazardous waste through tunnels, using this definition as a basis for 
criminal convictions.180 By regulation, the Commission adopted “[a]ll United 
States Department of Transportation regulations concerning . . . interstate 
transportation of hazardous materials by motor carriers for the purpose of 
enforcing such regulations against motor carriers operating in Ohio while 
engaged in interstate commerce.”181 In rejecting a nondelegation challenge to 
this regulation, the court reasoned that it was constitutional for the legislature 
to delegate discretion to the commission to fix the standards for safety within a 
clearly defined range.182 In other words, as long as the state agency’s adoption 
of federal standards were within the permissible range of delegated authority, 
no state separation of powers violation is present.183 Identification of specific 
constraints on the content of a state’s incorporation of federal law—i.e., 
statutory language that speaks to whether or how it can be used by an agency 
or a court—can provide reviewing courts some basis for evaluating whether a 
future change in the law is an abuse of its discretion. Such judicial monitoring 
will likely serve as the most rigid constraint on future legal change where, as 
in Ohio, some clear ex ante legislative or regulatory constraints on the 
agency’s authority to use federal law, can be identified.  
However, even if specific statutory language can be identified to rigidly 
constrain the operative effect of dynamic federal law, a state legislature’s 
purpose in making a delegation can also be helpful to state courts in evaluating 
                                                                                                                     
 179 Cf. Bressman, supra note 172, at 532–33 (suggesting that administrative standards 
“are necessary to improve the rationality, fairness, and predictability . . . of administrative 
decisionmaking”).  
 180 State v. Basham, 573 N.E.2d 773, 774 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989).  
 181 Id. (second alteration in original) (citing OHIO ADMIN. CODE 4901:2-5-02).  
 182 Id. at 775 (citing Belden v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 55 N.E.2d 629, 635 (1944)). 
 183 Id.  
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whether this is an abuse of discretion. Consider California’s State Agricultural 
Adjustment Act, which made the orders and regulations of the Federal 
Secretary of Agriculture “heretofore or hereafter made” the law of California 
“when and in so far as within the standards” specified by state law.184 A state 
agency was authorized by statute to issue marketing licenses consistent with 
the federal regulations, but only after making an administrative determination 
that the federal regulations carried out the purposes of state legislation and 
conformed to its standards.185 The California Supreme Court rejected a 
constitutional challenge to this statute, reasoning that it does not effectuate 
“automatic incorporation by reference of future federal laws.”186 Instead, the 
court highlighted, the statute merely “declared policy of making our law 
correspond with federal regulation under circumstances set forth in our 
statute.”187  
To the extent that a legislature has made a decision to favor a delegation 
based on federal law for purposes related to promoting uniformity and 
efficiency, or for purposes of advancing a cooperative federalism program, 
attention to legislative purposes can assist courts in identifying substantive 
constraints on the delegation. It is notable that many of the state cases 
discussed above which strike delegations that use federal standards do not 
make any effort at all to identify legislative purpose behind the delegation.188 
Interestingly, however, where courts that do address the legislative purposes 
(or benefits) behind the incorporation of dynamic federal law, they are much 
more inclined to uphold state legislative incorporation of dynamic federal 
law.189  
This does not mean, however, that dynamic federal law can have a legal 
effect without any judicial scrutiny. State courts are not always deferential in 
reviewing agency implementation of statutes.190 It thus might be expected that 
in reviewing state agency choices regarding federal programs that state courts 
will carefully examine agency interpretations, especially to the extent that 
there is possible constitutional concern. Examination of legislative purpose is 
                                                                                                                     
 184 Brock v. Superior Court, 71 P.2d 209, 212–13 (Cal. 1937) (quoting California 
Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1935, § 5(1), 1935 Cal. Stat. 1032).  
 185 Id. at 210–11. 
 186 Id. at 213. 
 187 Id. (citing examples of contingent legislation, where some foreign law triggers 
retaliatory licenses or tax measures under state law).  
 188 See supra Part III. 
 189 See, e.g., People v. Blackorby, 586 N.E.2d 1231, 1237 (Ill. 1992) (“His conduct 
was exactly the type of conduct the legislature intended to protect its citizens against by its 
incorporation of the Federal standards into the Illinois Vehicle Code.”). 
 190 See Saiger, supra note 176, at 558; see also Gluck, supra note 32, at 604–05; D. 
Zachary Hudson, Comment, A Case for Varying Interpretive Deference at the State Level, 
119 YALE L.J. 373, 374 (2009).  
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commonly accepted in the context of such review at the state level.191 In 
reviewing state agency interpretations, what Abbe Gluck calls the “modified 
textualism” approach (a methodological approach to stare decisis used by 
Oregon and other state Supreme Courts), commonly looks to context and 
purposes, as well as statutory text.192 It might even be expected for this to 
happen more frequently at the state level, to the extent that elected judges have 
greater interpretive freedom in interpreting statutes than their federal 
counterparts.193 
Consider that many state courts that have been inclined to reject state 
health, safety, and welfare programs based on dynamic federal law also appear 
to be more accepting of similar delegations in the business or tax regulation 
contexts. In business and tax contexts, courts seem more attentive to how 
legislatures have an interest to promoting uniformity, in order to ensure 
consistency and predictability regarding the operation of commerce and fiscal 
policy.194 Legislative purpose, in other words, appears too significant to many 
state courts in deciding when some delegations are permissible, perhaps out of 
deference to principles of legislative sovereignty in state constitutions. To the 
extent such a principle is applied consistently to different types of statutes, 
courts should be more likely to uphold delegations based on dynamic federal 
law where there are clear legislative purposes favoring uniformity, 
administrative efficiency, and conformity to federal law (as either a floor or a 
ceiling).  
As an example, consider how state courts appear to weigh uniformity 
interests heavily in considering constitutional challenges to state statutes that 
incorporate or rely on federal definitions of terms of such as “income” for tax 
purposes. Some state courts have invalidated statutory provisions that adopt 
future changes to future tax laws,195 and still others readopt the provisions of 
the IRS Code each year to avoid any potential nondelegation problem with 
relying on federal tax law.196 However, most state courts appear to have 
rejected constitutional challenges to these kinds of delegations based on 
incorporation of dynamic federal tax law. Tennessee’s Supreme Court upheld 
a statute making individual retirement plans taxable if subject to a federal 
                                                                                                                     
 191 See Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: 
Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750, 1829–
30 (2010). 
 192 Id. 
 193 Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl & Ethan J. Leib, Elected Judges and Statutory 
Interpretation, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 1215, 1221, 1238 (2012).  
 194 See, e.g., McFaddin v. Jackson, 738 S.W.2d 176, 182 (Tenn. 1987) (quoting Alaska 
S.S. Co. v. Mullaney, 180 F.2d 805, 816–17 (9th Cir. 1950)). 
 195 E.g., Cheney v. St. Louis Sw. Ry. Co., 394 S.W.2d 731, 732 (Ark. 1965) (holding 
unconstitutional the establishment of tax liability based on a formula subject to prospective 
federal regulations). 
 196 In order to avoid any question of unconstitutionality, Florida adopts the provisions 
of the Internal Revenue Code each year. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 220.03(3) (West Supp. 2016).  
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estate tax.197 Even though this was a general delegation that allowed even 
future IRS regulations to dictate results in Tennessee, the court reasoned that 
this is simply an example of contingent legislation—specifying a particular 
event that affects the state’s laws—and also found it significant that the 
legislature retained the power to withdraw its approval of any future change to 
federal law.198 The court also emphasized the need for uniformity and 
administrative simplicity in conforming federal and state tax enforcement.199 
In reviewing Alaska law that adopts federal tax law “as now in effect or 
hereafter amended,” the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit also 
rejected a delegation challenge, recognizing the “convenience to the taxpayer,” 
“simplicity of administration,” and other coordination benefits in conforming 
tax standards.200 Other states have reached the same conclusion upholding the 
use of federal tax law against constitutional nondelegation challenges,201 
though some states also have adopted state constitutional amendments that 
explicitly allow state incorporation of dynamic federal tax law.202  
Scholars defending cases that have upheld delegations based on dynamic 
federal tax law have highlighted the benefits of uniformity in tax standards.203 
They also point to the benefits of respecting a legislative desire for 
conformity.204 However, it is not clear why a legislative preference for 
uniformity or administrative simplicity should be given significant weight in 
the tax context, while such a legislative preference appears to be ignored 
entirely by state courts when discussing health, safety and environmental 
                                                                                                                     
 197 McFaddin, 738 S.W.2d at 177. 
 198 Id. at 179–80. 
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Mo. CONST. art. X, § 4(d); NEB. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(B); N.M CONST. art. IV, § 18; N.Y 
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 203 See generally Arnold Rochvarg, State Adoption of Federal Law—Legislative 
Abdication or Reasoned Policymaking?, 36 ADMIN. L. REV. 277 (1984).  
 204 Jim B. Grant, Jr., Commentary, Conforming the State Income Tax to Federal Tax 
Law: Prospective Incorporation of Federal Changes and the Nondelegation Doctrine, 40 
ALA. L. REV. 233, 249–50 (1988). 
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regulation. These regulatory areas too may sometimes value a parroting of 
federal standards at the state level, to promote uniformity or administrative 
efficiency. If there is some identifiable legislative purpose in uniformity or 
efficiency, this provides state courts some basis against which they can 
evaluate whether an agency is abusing its discretion, even where specific 
statutory constraints may be lacking. 
Courts also seem willing to look to legislative purpose where states are 
using federal law as a floor in defining and enforcing standards (rather than a 
ceiling, as occurs with uniform standards). Consider the statutes authorizing 
regulation of consumer fraud practices known as “mini-FTC Acts.”205 
Florida’s statute delegates to the state Attorney General the authority to define 
“unfair methods of competition” and “unfair or deceptive acts or practices” by 
regulation.206 The state’s mini-FTC Act states that these regulations “must not 
be inconsistent with the rules, regulations, and decisions of the Federal Trade 
Commission and the federal courts” under the provisions of section 5(a)(1) of 
the Federal Trade Commission Act.207 In considering a constitutional 
challenge to an earlier version of this statute, the Florida Supreme Court noted 
that it is not unconstitutionally vague or a violation of due process, because it 
gives persons of common intelligence sufficient warning regarding well-
settled, albeit evolving, legal terms under federal law.208 Even though the 
Florida statute also allowed for the incorporation of federal law “as from time 
to time amended” the court also held that this was a valid delegation of 
authority because it is a “law complete in itself,” containing “valid limitations 
to provide rules for the complete operation and enforcement of the law within 
its expressed general purpose.”209  
Moreover, the Florida Supreme Court reasoned, the state’s Attorney 
General could still take a more restrictive view than the FTC of what business 
practices are allowed under the statute210—using federal law as a floor, not a 
ceiling for consumer protection. In the context of regulating business 
marketing and advertising practices, many companies market products 
nationwide, making some uniformity in regulation across jurisdictions 
desirable. Still, as Henry Butler and Joshua Wright have observed, many state 
mini-FTC Acts result in more substantial prohibitions of business conduct than 
                                                                                                                     
 205 See Butler & Wright, supra note 24, at 164–65, 169–70 and accompanying text 
(describing how these statutes draw on model statutes, such as the Uniform Deceptive 
Trade Practices Act and the Model Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law).  
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Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926)).  
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Griffin, 239 So. 2d 577, 580 (Fla. 1970)). 
 210 Id. at 267. 
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those approved by the FTC.211 In upholding the delegation under Florida’s 
mini-FTC Act Florida’s Supreme Court interpreted the statute’s purpose as 
embracing a floor based on FTC standards, but as not requiring these standards 
to constitute the ceiling regarding prohibited trade practices.  
State courts appear to consistently identify uniformity purposes, or 
purposes related to cooperative federalism programs in tax and business 
related statutes. It is thus somewhat puzzling to see many courts refuse to 
engage the same set of purposes when evaluating the constitutionality of 
health, safety, and environmental legislation.212 Even though uniformity 
interests may not be as significant in these contexts, state legislatures still may 
have interests in promoting efficiency and coordination. Some of those 
interests could well connect to a state legislatures policy choice to treat federal 
standards as a floor, not a ceiling—as Florida’s Supreme Court recognized 
with mini-FTC Acts. To look to these purposes to uphold legislation in some 
contexts, but to fail to even make an effort in identifying these purposes in 
others is puzzling, at the very least, and suggests that state courts are not 
always even handed in the manner in which they approach these kinds of 
delegation issues. In addition, it is important to recognize how identification of 
these purposes provide some gauge against which courts can evaluate agency 
discretion. For example, if a tax regulator is expected to pursue uniformity, 
this purpose can serve to evaluate a tax regulator’s exercise of discretion in 
making a particular regulatory decision. Likewise, in implementing a 
cooperative federalism program that incorporates a dynamic source of federal 
law as a floor, the discretion of a state regulator is not without limit. Instead, 
based on a fixed source of state law, whether framed in terms of specific 
statutory language or general legislative purpose, a court has some basis for 
monitoring future legal change for conformity with intent of the state 
legislature.  
2. Incorporating External Considerations and Constraints— 
“Hard Look Federalism” 
Beyond simple incorporation of federal law that may change due to some 
future act of Congress, as many of the examples above show, many state 
statutes incorporating federal law frequently adopt future federal agency 
regulations.213 When dynamic federal law is agency regulation, it is wrong to 
consider future federal law as completely up for grabs. Any dynamic federal 
law is still subject to the constraints and limitations under the specific federal 
statutes that authorize a federal agency to regulate, as well as requirements in 
federal administrative law. State courts addressing the incorporation of 
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dynamic federal law have failed to assess whether these external standards 
also become a part of the state’s incorporation of federal law.214 To the extent 
that they do, federal statutes and administrative law can provide state courts 
relevant considerations to consider in assessing whether future changes in 
federal law are appropriate. 
Relative to state legislatures, whose delegations are often subject to ex 
ante constraints under state constitutions, under the U.S. Constitution 
Congress’s delegations to federal agencies are subject to lax constraints on 
legal change. Importantly, however, when Congress delegates authority to a 
federal agency, that agency still must comply with the statute delegating 
authority and, under federal administrative law, judicial review imposes ex 
post constraints, relevant considerations, and procedures as limits on future 
legal change by the agency.215 The extent that this is may be considered a part 
of the law adopted by a state legislature when it incorporates dynamic federal 
law has important implications for how state courts engage in appellate review 
of legal change that is precipitated by federal law.  
At its most fundamental level, a decision by any federal agency could be 
considered ultra vires under the statute that delegates authority to it, or may 
contravene a statute to the extent that the agency bases its decision on a factor 
that Congress has prohibited it from considering. Based on the scope of 
Congress’s delegation to an agency or specific statutory provisions that 
prohibit or foreclose a federal agency from regulating an activity, 
congressional lawmakers typically limit the ability of a federal agency to 
expand its regulatory reach.216 At the very least, whenever a state legislature 
adopts dynamic federal law it should be understood that it is legislating against 
the backdrop of any existing statutory limitations on federal agencies under 
federal law. Put another way, any state legislature adopting dynamic federal 
law also effectively incorporates any fixed statutory constraints on legal 
change by a federal agency—even though those constraints come from an 
external source, i.e., federal statutes, rather than a source of law internal to a 
particular state.  
Apart from agency-specific federal statutes, federal administrative law 
also provides some important constraints on future legal change by agencies. 
A decision by any federal agency to change existing federal standards must 
comply with the procedures articulated in the federal Administrative 
Procedures Act (APA), such as the requirement to engage in notice and 
comment rulemaking prior to changing existing agency regulations.217 It is 
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well established that federal administrative procedure will limit, to at least 
some degree, an agency’s ability to change its regulations.218 For example, any 
regulations adopted by a federal agency following notice and comment 
rulemaking cannot be changed or revoked at will, but must go through a 
similar process prior to their modification.219 Such procedural safeguards for 
federal agencies, I would submit, also presumably become a part of any state 
law adopting dynamic federal law.  
Consider, for example, the approach of the Wisconsin Supreme Court in 
considering a state agency’s incorporation of EPA technical regulations 
(including later interpretations) to determine the asbestos content in bulk 
samples. The court upheld state agency regulation against a nondelegation 
challenge by basically applying Chevron-type deference to EPA’s 
interpretation as endorsed by a Wisconsin agency.220 A dissenter objected on 
the grounds that the EPA interpretation had not gone through notice and 
comment, even though the Wisconsin agency used a notice and comment 
process.221 This case highlights how, the federal administrative process can, if 
recognized as part of dynamic federal law when state legislatures incorporate 
it, serve to encourage procedures by federal agencies to ensure notice to the 
public and its opportunity to participate, especially if a federal agency hopes to 
see its regulations have some effect in state lawmaking. Where a federal 
agency has used notice and comment rulemaking in adopting new regulations, 
the rationales for a state deferring to the federal agency seem strong—
especially where a state legislature has made a policy judgment to favor a 
federal agency’s approach because this is consistent with a general legislative 
purpose. However, as the dissenter in Wisconsin warned, one concern may be 
whether the federal standard at issue had been adopted through notice and 
comment rulemaking by the federal agency.222  
                                                                                                                     
 218 See, e.g., Peter L. Strauss, Comment, The Rulemaking Continuum, 41 DUKE L.J. 
1463, 1468–75 (1992) (outlining the spectrum of agency rulemaking activities).  
 219 See, e.g., Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1206 (2015) (allowing an 
agency to interpret its statutes without notice and comment rulemaking, but also suggesting 
that a rule adopted by notice and comment rulemaking cannot be amended through 
conflicting interpretive rules). For discussion, see generally Matthew P. Downer, Note, 
Tentative Interpretations: The Abracadabra of Administrative Rulemaking and the End of 
Alaska Hunters, 67 VAND. L. REV. 875 (2014).  
 220 State v. Harenda Enters., Inc., 746 N.W.2d 25, 38 (Wis. 2008) (noting that the 
EPA’s interpretation of an ambiguous statutory term is entitled to judicial deference when 
it does not contravene statutory purpose or is otherwise clearly erroneous).  
 221 Id. at 45 (Ziegler, J., dissenting). 
 222 Id. at 45–46. Despite this concern, I am not sure that this would have been 
problematic to the extent that the Wisconsin agency used notice and comment rulemaking 
in adopting the federal standard.  
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Beyond these kinds of procedural protections, federal agencies are also 
subject to ex post arbitrariness review in federal courts.223 This type of review 
is available in federal court under the APA regardless of whether the federal 
agency makes its decision through notice and comment rulemaking or with 
less public participation, as may occur with agency guidance documents.224 As 
Professor Bressman and others have highlighted, arbitrary and capricious 
review in federal court can serve the function of monitoring a federal agency’s 
compliance with statutory and other legal considerations.225 Whenever a state 
legislature adopts dynamic federal law contingent on future federal agency 
actions, the arbitrariness constraints on these under federal law should be 
considered a part of the state legislative laws constraining future legal change.  
To the extent that federal administrative procedure, including the relevant 
considerations under arbitrary and capricious review, are incorporated into 
state law concerning future legal change of federal standards, future changes in 
federal law are not without limit. For example, even in the instance where a 
federal agency has made legal changes without notice and comment 
rulemaking, as in the Wisconsin case above, it is still not clear to me that the 
concerns of the Wisconsin dissenter are warranted.226 Even absent federal 
notice and comment procedures, changes in federal standards adopted outside 
of rulemaking must comply with federal publication requirements.227  
More significantly, they also are subject to arbitrary and capricious review 
in federal court.228 Applying this review standard, a court could evaluate the 
relevant considerations that an agency takes into account in making its 
decision.229 Even if it used the correct procedures, under the arbitrariness 
standard a federal agency still may not be able to support its legal change if it 
violated statutory criteria, failed to consider relevant considerations, or 
otherwise lacks sufficient reasoning to support its legal change.  
My basic proposal is that, at the very minimum, when a state legislature 
makes a choice to rely on legal change that is dependent on the future choices 
of a federal agency, the federal statutory and administrative limitations on that 
agency’s decisions become a part of state law, providing a set of principles 
                                                                                                                     
 223 See Mark Seidenfeld, Substituting Substantive for Procedural Review of Guidance 
Documents, 90 TEX. L. REV. 331, 352–57 (2011) (arguing for arbitrariness for review of 
guidance documents and discussing some of the practical barriers to this).  
 224 See, e.g., id. at 331. 
 225 See generally Bressman, supra note 172 and accompanying text. 
 226 See supra note 221 and accompanying text.  
 227 See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (2012) (outlining federal agency requirements to make 
available and publish documents that affect the public).  
 228 5 U.S.C. § 706(1)(A) (providing for judicial review in federal court of federal 
agency action under the arbitrary and capricious standard).  
 229 The seminal federal case on arbitrary and capricious review requires an agency to 
consider “relevant factors” even if they are not mentioned in a statute. That same case, of 
course, also makes it clear that it is impermissible for an agency to consider “factors which 
Congress has not intended it to consider.” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. 
Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). 
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state courts can invoke in reviewing agency decisions. In other words, the state 
“opts in” to federal law concerning legal change—including both substantive 
statutes and administrative law. This includes state courts engaging in a form 
of “hard look federalism”—in ex post judicial review of state agency 
decisions, state courts could treat such limitations and relevant considerations 
under federal law as a part of the state’s law for these purposes. Where 
regulations change in the future at the state level, due to the incorporation of 
dynamic federal law, the arbitrary and capricious standard in state court would 
provide an opportunity to consider challenges to dynamic federal law on state 
law terms, without a state ceding any control over evaluation of the 
arbitrariness of lawmaking to the national government.  
The source of this kind of hard look federalism may be existing state 
administrative procedure, as many state APAs routinely provide for arbitrary 
and capricious review of agency decisions. In many states, appellate courts 
could readily do this under existing statutory standards of review.230 It has 
been recognized, though, that not all states provide for the same form of 
arbitrariness of agencies review available in federal courts.231 Regardless of 
any variations in administrative law across states, however, by adopting 
dynamic federal law a state legislature has implicitly authorized a state court to 
review legal change precipitated by a federal agency under the arbitrary and 
capricious standard—at least for purposes of state agency adoption of future 
federal legal changes. The state, in other words, has effectively also opted into 
having its courts apply a federal arbitrary and capricious review standard 
regarding future changes in federal law. 
It is novel to suggest that state courts should look to federal arbitrary and 
capricious review to identify relevant considerations and constraints on a 
federal agency’s decision. But it is hardly a stretch to recognize external 
sources of law under established principles of arbitrary and capricious review. 
To take one example, under federal administrative law, it is common for an 
agency to bootstrap its reasoning—and for a court to apply the arbitrary and 
capricious standard—using law and other relevant factors from outside of the 
                                                                                                                     
 230 Many state administrative procedure acts already provide for review under the 
arbitrary and capricious or abuse of discretion standard. For example, the 2010 Model State 
Administrative Procedure Act (MSAPA) directs courts to provide relief is “agency action 
is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 
REVISED MODEL STATE ADMIN. PROCEDURE ACT § 508(a)(3)(C) (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF 
COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 2010). The comments to the MSAPA cite approvingly 
William Araiza’s view that the “[j]udiciary, not [the] legislature, [is the] appropriate body 
to evolve specific standards for review, because of [the] great variety of agency action and 
contexts.” See id. § 508(a)(3)(C) cmt. (citing William D. Araiza, In Praise of a Skeletal 
APA: Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, Judicial Remedies for Agency 
Inaction, and the Questionable Value of Amending the APA, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 979, 993 
(2004)).  
 231 Cf. William Funk, Rationality Review of State Administrative Rulemaking, 43 
ADMIN. L. REV. 147, 147 (1991) (noting how in many states State Farm review has been 
ignored or affirmatively rejected).  
502 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 77:2 
particular statute under which an agency is making a decision. As Richard 
Pierce notes, relevant materials for consideration by an agency in exercising 
their discretion not only include that agency’s own statutes and regulations, 
but broader common law and statutory sources of law and other materials 
outside of the statute in which Congress directed an agency to address a 
question.232 Although a federal agency making a decision is not required to 
consider related statutes or problems,233 and an agency cannot consider a 
factor Congress has prohibited from considering,234 where a statute itself is 
silent about a logically relevant factor an agency may consider this.235 Federal 
courts reviewing agency action have routinely allowed agencies to explain 
their decisions using sources outside of the statute governing a particular 
agency that has been delegated authority to interpret laws, especially where 
they are logically relevant to the agency’s decision.236 If federal courts 
routinely do this, it also does not seem to be much of a stretch for state 
courts—especially those inclined to be less deferential to agencies and more 
exacting in arbitrary and capricious review—to do the same. The case for such 
review may be especially compelling where, without judicial review of an 
agency’s decision, there would otherwise be constitutional concerns with 
incorporation of dynamic sources of law.  
It has been recognized that judicial review in many states is more rigorous 
than in the federal courts.237 Thus, it is quite possible that this proposal could 
lead state courts to reject federal standards as arbitrary and capricious (at least 
                                                                                                                     
 232 Richard J. Pierce, Jr., What Factors Can an Agency Consider in Making a 
Decision?, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 67, 72–73, 88 (highlighting how the Supreme Court 
and lower courts have allowed agencies to consider any factors that were logically relevant 
to the question before the agency, even though the statute that authorized the agency to 
resolve the question did not explicitly list those factors).  
 233 Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 645–46 (1990).  
 234 Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 464–69 (2001).  
 235 See, e.g., Michigan v. U.S. EPA, 213 F.3d 663, 678 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (noting that 
Congress has forbidden an agency from considering a logically relevant decisional factor 
only when there is “clear congressional intent to preclude” agency consideration of the cost 
factor (quoting Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. U.S. EPA, 824 F.2d 1146, 1163 (D.C. Cir. 
1987) (en banc))).  
 236 See, e.g., Pierce, supra note 232, at 73–74. Pierce notes that this is consistent with 
the advice Jerry Mashaw and David Harfst provided NHTSA following their detailed case 
study of its decision-making process against the backdrop of the State Farm case:  
This agency, any agency, should always read between the lines of its statute an 
implicit qualification of the form: “Don’t forget that this statute does not exhaust our 
vision of the good life or the good society. Remember that we have other goals and 
other purposes that will sometimes conflict with the goals and purposes of this statute. 
If we forgot to mention all those potential conflicting purposes in your instructions, 
take note of them anyway. For heaven’s sake, be reasonable.” 
Id. at 74 (quoting JERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO 
SAFETY 214–15 (1990)). 
 237 See, e.g., Saiger, supra note 176, at 556–57.  
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for purposes of state law), even though no federal court has done so. However, 
I do not advance hard look federalism as an invitation for state courts to apply 
subject federal law to greater scrutiny than federal courts (although if they 
have a good reason they may). Instead this approach merely recognizes that 
state courts can offer something different, in terms of the timing of review and 
their substantive perspective on legal interpretation, than their federal 
counterparts. In this sense, recognition of arbitrariness review, based on a state 
bootstrapping the relevant considerations under federal law, has important 
implications for the development of both federal and state administrative law. 
It presents a fertile opportunity—yet to be developed by state courts—for both 
state judiciaries and executive branch agencies to play a more significant role 
in the development of federal law.  
This approach would have some practical implications for state judicial 
review of regulatory change. First, legal change may face barriers to challenge 
in federal courts, due to standing and finality requirements, whereas state law 
may provide for judicial review—in part because a state regulatory agency’s 
decision to adopt a federal standard, even if not final for purposes of review in 
federal court, could still be final for purposes of review under state law. 
Second, even where no federal court has imposed the same kind of constraint 
on a federal agency, a state court could consider federal law as constraining a 
delegation to a state agency in arbitrary and capricious review. This kind of 
decision would have no precedential impact on federal law, but would instead 
only affect how that state treats legal change related to the dynamic 
incorporation of federal law.  
This also is not an unprecedented assertion of state judicial power: at the 
time of the Founding it was common for state courts to play a central role in 
interpreting federal law.238 Unlike at the time of the Founding, when state 
court interpretations of federal statutes may have controlled, here the state 
court assessment of the reasonableness of a federal agency only would have an 
immediate legal effect on the state’s voluntary incorporation of dynamic 
federal law; where federal courts have made a controlling interpretation of 
federal law that does not leave the state the option of opting into federal law, 
this would still preempt state judicial decisions to the contrary. Involving state 
courts in the interpretation of federal law can also produce desirable benefits 
for federalism—as state courts reach their own conclusions regarding the 
reasonableness of future changes in federal law. It is unlikely that the judiciary 
of every state will agree, and also not likely that state judiciaries will follow 
federal arbitrary and capricious review in lockstep. By engaging in such 
review state courts would not be limited to mere bystanders in the monitoring 
                                                                                                                     
 238 See Anthony J. Bellia Jr., State Courts and the Interpretation of Federal Statutes, 
59 VAND. L. REV. 1501, 1504–05 (2006). 
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of changes in federal law, and may even be able to play a significant trans-
state role in interpreting and legitimating dynamic federal law.239 
State court arbitrary and capricious review of a federal state agency’s 
change in law—using constraints, standards and considerations that are 
recognized under federal law—may enable state courts to play a more 
significant role in assessing that future legal changes related to federal law are 
not arbitrary. This kind of hard look federalism would also shift the role of 
state courts from using the nondelegation doctrine under their constitutions to 
impose a strong ex ante resistance norm against state incorporation of dynamic 
federal law, to use ex post judicial review in a manner similar to federal 
appellate courts. A notable democratic process federalism benefit of hard look 
federalism would be to more directly engage both state courts and state 
agencies in the evaluation of the relevant legal considerations and constraints 
on dynamic federal law. Such an approach can enable states to continue to 
experiment even further with the incorporation of dynamic federal law. By 
contrast, the traditional approach views federal courts as possessing a 
monopoly over the relevant considerations and constraints on legal change in 
federal law. This relegates state courts and agencies to the passive role of a 
bystander on the sidelines, rather than an active participant in the development 
of federal regulation.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
Treating the nondelegation doctrine as an ex ante limit on legislative 
incorporation of dynamic federal law significantly increases the costs of a state 
using the expertise and judgment of federal agencies to benefit its lawmaking 
process, promoting uniform and consistent approaches with neighboring 
jurisdictions, or coordinating with the federal government. But it also has 
implications for how we think about state constitutions. Dan Rodriguez once 
called for a “trans-state” constitutionalism, in which state constitutional issues 
are not entirely jurisdiction-specific but instead “raise similar stakes and have 
more or less similar shapes.”240 The study of state legislative adoption of 
dynamic federal law highlights how fixation on a jurisdiction-specific 
approach to dynamic incorporation of federal law has impoverished both state 
separation of powers and federalism.  
I have argued that a state court’s use of the nondelegation doctrine as an ex 
ante constrain on dynamic incorporation of federal law should be rejected as 
inconsistent with separation of powers under state constitutions. A functional 
approach to understanding separation of powers under state constitutions does 
not view separation of powers in state constitutions as fixated on protecting 
state sovereignty at all costs, especially where other important values, such as 
                                                                                                                     
 239 See Ethan J. Leib, Localist Statutory Interpretation, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 897, 920–
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 240 Daniel B. Rodriguez, State Constitutional Theory and Its Prospects, 28 N.M. L. 
REV. 271, 301 (1998).  
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participation, accountability, and nonarbitrariness can be advanced in 
significant ways by the incorporation of dynamic federal law.241 In many 
instances, as I have argued, looking to dynamic sources of federal law can 
create some accountability benefits for a state.242 Sometimes these benefits 
may even exceed the state government’s ability to protect accountability on its 
own. Through institutional design, a state legislature also can create 
accountable intermediaries, such agencies accountable to the state legislature, 
to ensure that dynamic federal law does not blindside citizens or otherwise 
affect a state’s interests in ways that a legislature would not endorse if it were 
adopting a specific federal standard on its own.  
Most significantly, the availability and role of ex post judicial review in 
protecting against arbitrary adoption and enforcement of future federal law 
should not be ignored in assessing separation of powers under state 
constitutions. Ex post review of federal legal change under the arbitrary and 
capricious standard is also not something over which federal courts should 
have a monopoly: Even where no specific state source of law is available for 
judicial review, any state legislature adopting dynamic federal law would 
expect federal statutes and administrative procedures to constrain future 
federal law. Thus, in incorporating dynamic federal law, a state legislature 
should be understood to be implicitly opting into any federal standards that 
limit future legal change. In applying arbitrariness review, state courts can use 
these external standards to bootstrap judicial review of dynamic federal law. 
This type of hard look federalism not only holds promise to return state 
separations of powers to its core purposes; it also opens up new possibilities 
that enhance the voice of state courts and agencies in the development and 
interpretation of federal law. 
  
                                                                                                                     
 241 There are notable federalism benefits too. Some of the staunchest advocates of 
courts endorsing resistance norms under the federal constitution view these resistance 
norms as enabling a form of process federalism. See Young, supra note 112, at 1607–08 
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